University of Windsor

Scholarship at UWindsor
Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Theses, Dissertations, and Major Papers

2007

Character and concept : how conceptual blending constrains
situationism
Brandon D.C. Fenton
University of Windsor

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/etd

Recommended Citation
Fenton, Brandon D.C., "Character and concept : how conceptual blending constrains situationism" (2007).
Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 4629.
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/etd/4629

This online database contains the full-text of PhD dissertations and Masters’ theses of University of Windsor
students from 1954 forward. These documents are made available for personal study and research purposes only,
in accordance with the Canadian Copyright Act and the Creative Commons license—CC BY-NC-ND (Attribution,
Non-Commercial, No Derivative Works). Under this license, works must always be attributed to the copyright holder
(original author), cannot be used for any commercial purposes, and may not be altered. Any other use would
require the permission of the copyright holder. Students may inquire about withdrawing their dissertation and/or
thesis from this database. For additional inquiries, please contact the repository administrator via email
(scholarship@uwindsor.ca) or by telephone at 519-253-3000ext. 3208.

Character and Concept: How Conceptual Blending Constrains Situationism

by
Brandon D.C. Fenton

A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty o f Graduate Studies
through the Department o f Philosophy
in Partial Fulfillment o f the Requirements for
the Degree o f Master o f Arts at the
University o f Windsor

Windsor, Ontario, Canada

2007

2007 Brandon D.C. Fenton

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

1*1

Library and
Archives Canada

Bibliotheque et
Archives Canada

Published Heritage
Branch

Direction du
Patrimoine de I'edition

395 W ellington Street
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada

395, rue W ellington
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada
Your file Votre reference
ISBN: 978-0-494-34905-2
Our file Notre reference
ISBN: 978-0-494-34905-2

NOTICE:
The author has granted a non
exclusive license allowing Library
and Archives Canada to reproduce,
publish, archive, preserve, conserve,
communicate to the public by
telecommunication or on the Internet,
loan, distribute and sell theses
worldwide, for commercial or non
commercial purposes, in microform,
paper, electronic and/or any other
formats.

AVIS:
L'auteur a accorde une licence non exclusive
permettant a la Bibliotheque et Archives
Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver,
sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public
par telecommunication ou par I'lnternet, preter,
distribuer et vendre des theses partout dans
le monde, a des fins commerciales ou autres,
sur support microforme, papier, electronique
et/ou autres formats.

The author retains copyright
ownership and moral rights in
this thesis. Neither the thesis
nor substantial extracts from it
may be printed or otherwise
reproduced without the author's
permission.

L'auteur conserve la propriete du droit d'auteur
et des droits moraux qui protege cette these.
Ni la these ni des extraits substantiels de
celle-ci ne doivent etre imprimes ou autrement
reproduits sans son autorisation.

In compliance with the Canadian
Privacy Act some supporting
forms may have been removed
from this thesis.

Conformement a la loi canadienne
sur la protection de la vie privee,
quelques formulaires secondaires
ont ete enleves de cette these.

While these forms may be included
in the document page count,
their removal does not represent
any loss of content from the
thesis.

Bien que ces formulaires
aient inclus dans la pagination,
il n'y aura aucun contenu manquant.

i*i

Canada
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Abstract
This thesis is an attempt to defend the notion o f character from concerns
raised recently by situationists (namely, John Doris & Gilbert Harman). Situationism
attempts to undermine the concept o f character used to support most versions o f
virtue ethics by appealing to research in the social sciences. More specifically, both
John Doris and Gilbert Harman are global character trait eliminativists who take the
social-psychological research to warrant the abandonment o f the concept o f character.
This thesis draws heavily upon the mental space mapping theory known as conceptual
blending developed by Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner. I make use o f the insights
provided by conceptual blending theory in an attempt to disarm the situationists’
character eliminativist position by showing how entrenched and useful is the notion
o f character to our common understandings and interpretations o f ourselves and
others.
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1.0 Introduction

Perhaps one o f the most well known cases in which we are likely to make
ascriptions o f character is when we are first introduced to someone we have never
met before— an event so well recognized and generally treated as bearing such a great
deal o f importance that it has become commonly known as ‘the first impression’.
Indeed, this catch phrase betrays our tendency to make such character ascriptions.
The word ‘impression’, in the notion o f ‘the first impression’, suggests that the
fundamental aspects o f a lasting image o f the type o f character or personality that one
is believed to have are decided in the mind o f the other in these moments. This is not
to say that these rapid ascriptions based on limited and typically not altogether
truthful personal information are always accurate. In fact, there are many reasons to
think that such ascriptions are more often erroneous than not; people tend to want to
emphasize their positive attributes and downplay their shortcomings when first being
introduced to others— a tendency that has earned a couple o f catch phrases o f its own,
such as, ‘putting your best foot forward,’ and ‘putting on your best face’. However,
the tendency to make character attributions seems to persist, even in the face o f what
must often turn out to be false ascriptions. Indeed, it is not all that uncommon to hear
statements like, “I got a bad vibe from him” or, “There’s something not quite right
with that one,” in common parlance. What these kinds o f generally vague statements
are intended to imply is something more specific about the character o f the person
commented upon; for example, in reference to the two common statements above,
what is implied is that the individual is untrustworthy, dishonest, or even dangerous.
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We seem to rely upon these rapid character ascriptions to mediate our modes o f
interaction with one another. Positive ascriptions seem to allow for a sense o f comfort
when in the presence o f the other, and they may encourage a continued interaction,
while negative ascriptions, on the other hand, signal the need for caution in dealing
with the individual and often seem to encourage a policy o f avoidance.
We even make character ascriptions about people we have never actually met.
Perhaps even more surprising is that such ascriptions are often based solely on
appearances— and even these may be the handiwork o f advertising and marketing
firms. For example, we may come to see a candidate who is vying for office as having
an indecisive type o f character based solely on the suggestions o f the political
campaign messages o f his or her challenger which state that the candidate has been
known to ‘flip-flop’ on important issues. This is perhaps why political ‘smear’
campaigns are so pervasive; once the image we hold o f a candidate’s character is
created, or tarnished, it is hard to imagine that they would behave in any other way
than what would typically be expected o f someone with such a character. What this
and the ‘first impression’ example have in common is a particular understanding o f
the notion o f character. It is an understanding that character is relatively stable and
consistent. In other words, once we make a character ascription, we assume that there
will be little if any change in the characteristic behaviour we would expect to see
from the person given the type o f character that they were ascribed. That is to say,
once we make a character judgment, it seems to stick. So the indecisive politician is
still considered to have an indecisive kind o f character, and is expected to remain
unsure of his or her decisions, even when it is quite clear that he or she is resolutely
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advocating a particular position on some issue, so long as our awareness o f their
decisiveness comes after the original character attribution o f ‘indecisiveness’ was
made. Also, one may continue to feel uncomfortable around another individual from
whom they received a ‘bad vibe,’ regardless o f whether or not any cogent reason for
such uneasiness has been observed in subsequent interactions. W hat these two
introductory examples were intended to convey is both that the attribution and
assessment o f character or personality is a very common practice, and that the
concept o f character most commonly employed in such processes is one that takes
character to be a stable and enduring phenomenon. But, one might ask, “How did we
come to think o f character in this way?”
Our modem notions o f personality and character have been deeply influenced
by a tradition that dates back to the writings o f Aristotle. In his Nicomachean Ethics,
Aristotle developed a theory o f morality in which the idea o f virtue was intimately
connected with a particular understanding o f character— one not unlike the current
common view. Indeed, in his ethical treatise, Aristotle (Kaplan [Ed.], 1958) suggested
that, “[Virtuous] action must proceed from a firm and unchangeable character”
(p. 187). However, there are certain other conditions o f the agent that Aristotle
thought also needed to be met in order for one’s action to be considered morally just
or temperate— independently o f whether or not the action issued from a ‘firm and
unchanging character.’ These additional conditions were that the agent must have
knowledge (presumably about what is the morally appropriate action to take), must
choose the acts, and the acts must be chosen for their own sakes (p. 187). These
additional conditions can be considered deeply relevant to the notion o f virtue, and as
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such, they may pose a serious problem for the position I will argue against; however,
since they are not crucial to the notion o f the stability o f character that I am currently
attempting to illustrate, these considerations and other details o f Aristotle’s ethical
theory will be postponed for the time being. What is important here is that it be
recognized that A ristotle’s view o f character as something that is ‘firm and
unchanging’ has come to be the dominant view o f character in m odem times.
The view that character is relatively stable and enduring has been responsible
for many o f the assumptions that underlie various psychological personality theories
and research programs, as well as moral theorizing, and educational planning. For
psychological personality theories, such as trait theory, and the Jungian typology, the
notion o f the relative stability o f character or personality (treated as synonymous in
this thesis), is central. In fact, without such a notion, these and similar theories would
lack internal coherence. Also, in regards to moral theory, the idea o f character and its
stability can be seen to play an important role in virtually any theory o f virtue ethics
since the time o f Aristotle. Moreover, ideas about how to develop virtuous character
dispositions in children have played a significant role in shaping educational practices
and policies. These practices and policies, had they not taken for granted that the
types o f character dispositions that they were designed to promote were enduring,
would have likely diverted resources to more promising proposals for behavioural
regulation. I mention these last three areas o f human endeavour with the intent to
convey just how deeply imbedded within our culture is the traditional Aristotelian
notion o f the stability and permanence of character; indeed, that this notion does not
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only inform our modes o f thinking about individuals, but that it also shapes important
social practices as well.
Nevertheless, that a particular view may be widely held does not guarantee its
accuracy. In at least some cases, neither how deeply a part o f the common
understanding a notion may be, nor how many practical activities are dependant upon
or influenced by such a notion, can testify to the accuracy o f the conception. For
example, it was once believed that the Earth was flat, and this notion was widely
accepted as being accurate since it was coherent with the general intuitions and
assumptions derived from normal visual perception. Also, it is not difficult to imagine
that the notion o f the world’s flatness likely influenced sailing and fishing practices,
as one would not want to fall off the edge o f the Earth. However, as time and
scientific advancements would show, the world is in fact not flat— and no amount of
people who continued to think that it was, nor sailor’s who would avoid the supposed
edge, could change that fact. In a similar vein, there are philosophers and
psychologists in the present era who are beginning to think that the traditional notion
o f character, despite its common acceptance and cultural imbeddedness, will likely
share the same fate as the notion o f the flat Earth; that is, it will be shown to be
obsolete.
Two o f the more notable philosophers to take on the view that the traditional
notions o f character are inaccurate are John Doris and Gilbert Harman. According to
Doris and Harman (D&H), recent experiments within social psychology undermine
the traditional concept o f character; consequently, they support the view that it is in
fact the situational context that is most responsible for the types o f behaviours that
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people display. They suggest that the results obtained in experiments designed to
study obedience and other forms o f situationally contingent behaviour should
encourage us not simply to re-evaluate the traditional Aristotelian view o f character—
one that they suggest is committed to robust and persistent personality or character
traits1— but to abandon it in favor o f what they consider to be a more empirically
informed understanding o f the determinants o f behaviour, namely, situational factors.
Indeed, in regards to traditional notions o f character, Doris claims, “I am— at least in
some attenuated sense— advocating their elimination” (2002, p. 108). Echoing Doris,
is Harman’s more spirited statement that, “We need to abandon all talk [and thought]
o f virtue and character, not find a way to save it by reinterpreting it” (2000b, p. 224).
The view endorsed by both D&H has come to be known as situationism.
Although there may be varying degrees o f commitment to the position that behaviour
is primarily situationally motivated— for example, Doris’ account allows for what he
calls ‘local character traits’, while Harman makes no such provision— they are at base
united by the view that the traditional conception o f character, in terms o f global
traits, is flawed and inaccurate, and that it ought to be replaced by an account of, and
an appreciation for, the situational context. According to Doris, the global view o f
character traits is committed to idea that, “character and personality traits are reliably
manifested [in a temporally stable manner] in trait-relevant behavior across a
diversity o f trait-relevant eliciting conditions that may vary widely in their

' According to G.W. Allport, a trait refers to “a certain definite conception o f a generalized responseunit in which resides the distinctive quality o f behavior that reflects personality” (1931, p. 368). He
later, defines a trait as: “a neuropsychic structure having the capacity to render many stimuli
functionally equivalent, and to initiate and guide equivalent (meaningfully consistent) forms o f
adaptive and expressive behaviour” (as cited in Hergenhahn, Olson & Cramer, p. 159). In short, a trait
is responsible for an individual’s behaving in a similar manner when faced with similar situational
contexts.
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conduciveness to the manifestation o f the trait in question” (2002, p. 22). He takes
local traits, on the other hand, to refer to “closely circumscribed evaluative
attributions” of behaviour that display predictive efficacy in only “narrowly specified
domains”. In other words, for a trait to be considered global (or robust) it must
motivate a certain type o f behavioural response across various situations, while local
traits need only to motivate a specific behavioural response in very specific contexts.
For example, one might possess the local trait o f “defends-family-and-friends
courage” while being an utter coward when it comes to asking someone out on a date;
whereas, if one were in possession o f a global trait o f courage, they would display the
courage to defend their family and friends, ask a person out on a date, sky-dive, and a
multitude o f other character-relevant behaviours across a vast range o f appropriate
eliciting conditions.
For both D&H, the attempt to undermine character acts as the base from
which they attempt to discredit virtue ethics. Since they suggest that the ethical theory
they are challenging depends upon a robust notion o f character, if they can
successfully undermine the view o f character that motivates the theory, they will, by
extension, undermine the ethical theory as well. As a result, if left unchallenged, their
work could have serious negative implications for, among other things, our notions of
responsibility, praise and blame, the practice o f law, and concepts o f self. In response
to the potential negative implications o f their shared position, I will expose some o f
the weaknesses o f their attempt to undermine global character, and I will also
challenge the view that the concept o f character ought to be abandoned. However, I
will, for the most part, not argue in favour o f any kind o f virtue ethics. If I can
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adequately defend the notion o f character, then I should have also, at least indirectly,
allowed for the possibility o f some kind o f theory o f virtue. Not to mention, as will be
seen in section 2.2 and 2.5, others have already argued fairly persuasively for the
preservation o f virtue based ethical theory.
However, before commenting upon my own position in any greater detail, I
will first consider the position o f both D&H, and examine some o f the more
impressive experiments that they have marshaled in support o f their contentions. As
will be shown, these social-psychological experiments have obtained some rather
striking and, perhaps to some, counterintuitive results. That these results often appear
to conflict with popular intuitions is a point that D&H consider to lend support to
their position; that is, because D&H think that the standard view o f character is false,
for them, it makes sense that normal attempts to make character based predictions
would not be borne out by the experimental data. This is why they both make mention
o f the psychological literature and experimental research on ‘the fundamental
attribution error’2 within their arguments; although these experiments do not
straightforwardly count against the notion o f character, what they do highlight is our
implicit tendency to make character based ascriptions erroneously. That is, by
typically undervaluing the situational context, they count against the usefulness and
reliability o f such character based behavioural ascriptions and predictions.

2 The fundamental attribution error refers to the common tendency to explain an individual’s behaviour
in terms o f personality or dispositions as opposed to relying on situational explanations (especially
where such behaviours can be shown to be due to the situation). For a more extensive treatment o f the
fundamental attribution error, see L. Ross (1977).
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1.1 The Case for Situationism

Although there are various psychological experiments from which the results
may be taken and construed as providing suggestive evidence against character, I will
focus on several frequently employed and stirring examples found within the
situationist literature. These examples, I suggest, should be sufficient to provide an
understanding o f the situationist argument, as well as some o f the reasons motivating
the development o f such a position. These examples, perhaps unexpectedly, are
separately composed o f such diverse elements as finding a dime, seminary students,
and the administration o f electrical shocks. In what follows, I will present these
creative experiments as well as D& H’s interpretative appraisals o f their results in as
favourable a light as possible. And later, in chapter two, I will move to an
examination o f some of the responses and critiques o f the position and interpretations
provided by D&H. The presentation o f the critical and alternative positions will be
followed by (in chapter three) what I consider to be a novel approach to challenging
the situationist position that I will develop by using the conceptual blending theory of
Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner. To close (in chapter four), I will present some
reflections upon the notion o f character inspired by Daniel D ennett’s views on the
‘se lf, followed by the conclusion (chapter four) and suggestions for future theorizing
and research.
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1.2 Dispositions vs. Dimes

The first experiment to be reviewed is the Isen and Levin (1972) study
regarding mood effects on prosocial (i.e. helping) behaviour. This study examined the
differences in helping behaviour between two groups that were only experimentally
differentiated by one o f the group’s oblivious participants having found a dime in the
coin return slot o f the telephone they had just used, while the other group did not find
a coin. After an unwitting participant finished using the telephone (either finding a
coin in the return slot or not), an experimental confederate would walk by and pretend
to accidentally drop a folder filled with papers. Those participants who stopped to
assist the confederate with the papers were considered to behave in a helpful way,
while those who did not assist the confederate were considered not to have behaved in
a helpful manner. Perhaps surprisingly, o f those who found a dime prior to the
confederate’s mishap, fourteen stopped to help while two did not; and o f those who
did not find a dime, one individual helped and twenty-four did not. So, while we may
think that the individual’s likelihood to help gather the papers is based upon their
character disposition to such behaviour (i.e. their helpful or compassionate character),
the experimental data suggests that it would be more accurate to attribute such
behaviours to an environmental (read: situational) factor as apparently trivial as
having found a dime. That is to say that, though we may assume, in a thought
experiment, that Jack, the self-absorbed, ego-centric male model would be highly
unlikely to help; while Jill, the nursing home volunteer would almost certainly rush to
lend a hand; what the experimental results reveal is that, in this case, not only do the
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character conceptions evoked by such prototypes have negligible import in regards to
predicting the relevant behaviour, but that something as seemingly inconsequential as
finding a dime can actually make the difference between an individual’s helping or
not helping. So, if the Jack o f our thought experiment finds the dime, the actual data
suggests that he will be much more likely to help than Jill will be if she does not find
a dime.
According to Doris, what makes these kinds o f experiments so remarkable is,
“that seemingly insubstantial situational factors have substantial effects on what
people do” (2002, p. 28). Indeed, what is at issue is not, as many would concede, that
forceful or demanding situational pressures influence behaviours, but that seemingly
trivial aspects o f one’s day to day environment can have a significant impact upon
what attitudes, behaviours, and actions one is likely to express. This has led Doris to
claim that, “the disproportionate impact o f these ‘insubstantial’ situational factors
presses charges o f empirical inadequacy against characterological moral psychology”
(2002, p. 28). In other words, because, for Doris, character-based moral psychology is
committed to a robust notion o f character— one that requires that a relevant character
trait (e.g. helpful, compassionate, or heroic behaviour), be displayed in the
appropriate eliciting condition— and these types o f experiments seem to more
accurately reflect the motivational impact o f either the presence or absence o f a
situational variable, then characterological moral psychology fails as a compelling
way to explain the observed differences in behaviour.
For Isen and Levin (1972), what is happening here is that the experience o f
finding some change in the coin return slot o f the telephone creates an elevated mood
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effect—people feel good when they encounter what appears to be good luck— and
this elevated mood effectively influences helping behaviour. For Doris, it is not the
idea that one’s mood may effect their behaviour that is compelling— he treats this
notion as trivially true and obvious—but rather, that one’s mood can be altered to
produce such overt behaviour by something as trifling as finding a dime.
Nevertheless, he cautions against judging the non-helpers in this scenario too harshly;
after all, helping to pick-up some dropped papers does not seem to rank as highly as
saving a drowning child, in terms o f its importance as a character relevant behaviour
eliciting condition. Nonetheless, to rank helping to pick-up papers as being an
eliciting condition o f low importance does not change the results o f the study—the
data stands that the mere finding o f a dime was enough to significantly influence what
can reasonably be considered to be character relevant behaviour in a way that does
not support characterological conceptions. However, in this experiment, the
participants did not undergo any kind o f personality assessment, which may
undermine one’s confidence that the results are not telling o f personality or character
dispositions. But for Doris, the odds that mostly compassionate or helpful character
types found the dime, while unhelpful and non-compassionate types did not find a
dime are slim and untroubling.

1.3 Bad Samaritans

The next experiment to be reviewed is derived from the Christian parable o f
the Good Samaritan. The parable recounts the story o f a man who was robbed,
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stripped, and beaten close to death while traveling from Jerusalem to Jericho. As he
lay wounded, three individuals pass by him separately; the first was a priest, the next
a Levite, and lastly, a Samaritan. Both the priest and the Levite, upon seeing the
injured man, cross over to the other side o f the road and continue on their way
without stopping to offer their assistance. However, when the Samaritan saw the man,
he approached him, dressed his wounds, and brought him to an inn. There he
instmcted the innkeeper to take care o f the man and paid him accordingly. In this
parable the Samaritan, it is preached, exemplifies the type o f moral character (or
action) that is appropriate to Christian aspirations.
Although one can imagine that the priest and the Levite had other pressing
responsibilities to attend to, while perhaps the Samaritan did not, the standard reading
o f this parable tends to emphasize the differences in character3 rather than the
differences in perceived time stress between the three passers by. That is to say, only
the Samaritan is considered to be a compassionate kind o f person, while the priest and
Levite are portrayed as having less flattering character types. In an attempt to discern
just what factors (be it time pressure, religiosity, or a certain moral disposition) may
be relevant to helping behaviour in such a scenario, Darley and Batson (1973)
conducted a study involving students from the Princeton Theological Seminary who
were recruited to take part in what they were told would be a study o f “religious
education and vocations.” To begin, the students were to fill out questionnaires in one
room before having to exit the building and pass through a courtyard on their way to a

3 O f course there are other ways to interpret the parable o f the good Samaritan; for example, rather than
placing the emphasis on differences in character, differences in perceived duty or moral judgment may
be emphasized.
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second location where they were told they would be required to give a short verbal
presentation. The experiment consisted o f three groups o f students, each o f which was
assigned a different degree o f temporal urgency. The first group was told upon
leaving the initial site that they were running late, the second group that they were
right on schedule, and the third that they would be a little early. These differing
urgency indicators given to the groups prior to their leaving the initial site
corresponded to how they would be classified in one o f three experimental
conditions: “high hurry”, “medium hurry”, and “low hurry” respectively.
While on their walk from the first site to the second, individual participants
from each group would separately encounter a confederate playing the part o f a
distressed individual hunched over and apparently in need o f some kind o f assistance.
Common intuitions would suggest that since these students were preparing for a life
of service in the ministry, they would be highly likely to offer some kind o f help or at
least to ask whether or not the individual needed any assistance. In other words, we
would expect that these individuals have the relevant type o f character dispositions to
want to be helpful based upon the professional trajectory (marked by an ethic o f
helping), that they had chosen. However, the results paint a different picture. Indeed,
helping behaviour appeared to vary considerably with the degree o f urgency o f the
experimental condition, with sixty-three percent o f the students helping in the “low
hurry” condition, forty-five percent helping in the “medium hurry” condition, and
down to only ten percent helping in the final “high hurry” category. That these results
conflict with what would be commonly expected from a group o f seminary students
(i.e. that there would be no difference in helping behaviour across conditions since
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they should all share a similar disposition towards helping), leads Harman to
conclude that, “standard interpretations o f the Good Samaritan Parable commit the
fundamental attribution error o f overlooking the situational factors, in this case
overlooking how much o f a hurry the various agents might be in” (2000a, p. 173).
According to Doris, when faced with such results, “it is difficult to resist
situationist conclusions” (2002, p. 34). Indeed, even if the hurried seminary students
may have thought that their commitments to the experimenter were temporarily o f a
higher order o f importance than their general obligation to inquire as to the wellbeing
o f the confederate, for Doris, it is not likely that such a consideration would be given
much weight (p. 34). Again, he says, “there is the appearance o f disproportion; in this
case the demands o f punctuality seem rather slight compared with the ethical demand
to at least check on the condition o f the confederate” (2002, p. 34). Thus again, it
appears that character relevant behaviour was influenced by a situational factor o f
seemingly less importance than the moral imperative encountered. Indeed, in this
case, as opposed to the ‘finding a dim e’ example, the moral imperative appears to be
o f a much higher order; that is, it can hardly be argued that helping someone to pick
up scattered papers is as morally compelling as the need to inquire into the wellbeing
o f someone who appears to be in significant physical distress. However, both
instances would seem to be appropriate for eliciting the relevant behaviour associated
with what one would expect from those with compassionate dispositions: namely,
helping.
These last two examples made reference to what may be considered noncoercive situational forces; that is, situational factors that would not typically be

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

16

construed as having impending or forceful influence against one’s ability to act in
concert with their perceived (or ascribed) character dispositions. The next experiment
to be reviewed, however, might be taken to be at least somewhat different in this
regard. It makes use o f what may be granted to be a fairly strong situational constraint
upon behaviour, regardless o f what are believed to be one’s character based
dispositions. That is to say, many people would likely agree that certain
environmental and situational factors can have a great degree o f control over what
behaviours one is likely to display, independently o f the type o f character one may
have. One such situation can be imagined wherein a subordinate is given orders by
another who would be classified as an authority figure. This situation is not unlike the
experiment that follows. However, what ought to be kept in mind throughout the next
section is that the participants were told at the outset that they may quit the
experiment at any time (which should somewhat offset the apparent forcefulness o f
the situation); and further, that people who were informed o f the experimental
procedure were no more reluctant to make character based predictions o f behaviour—
which would seem to signal a general belief that such conditions are not enough to
override character based moral dispositions.

1.4 Authority vs. Autonomy - A Shocking Situation

Imagine if you will, the following scenario: you decide to respond to a
newspaper add posted by a university that is seeking participants for a paid study
involving memory and learning. Upon arrival you are greeted by an experimenter
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wearing a lab coat who introduces you to another participant who will be taking part
in the experiment with you. A draw is performed and you are chosen for the position
o f ‘teacher’ while the other participant is selected for the ‘learner’ role. The ‘learner’
is a friendly middle aged accountant who is strapped down to a chair to restrict his
movement. An electrode is attached to his wrist which will be used to administer
shocks; you are assured that these will cause no “permanent tissue damage”, and you
are given a stinging example o f what such a shock feels like. In a separate room, you
are seated before what is labeled a “shock generator” and instructed that you will be
required to administer shocks o f an increasing magnitude (in fifteen volt increments)
to the other participant for each wrong answer (or non-answer) that he provides on a
word association test. The shocks register between ‘slight shock’ starting at fifteen
volts, and continue all the way to ‘Danger: Severe shock’ and ‘XX X ’ with a final
rating o f four-hundred and fifty volts o f electricity. Should you pause or express any
trepidation about what is taking place you are repeatedly enjoined by the
experimenter in a firm but polite manner to “Please continue,” or that “The
experiment requires that you continue,” or that “It is absolutely essential that you
continue,” and finally that “You have no other choice, you must go on.” How far do
you envision would you be likely to go?
This scenario is exactly what happened in the famous series o f experiments
performed by Stanley Milgram at Yale University in the early nineteen-sixties. O f
course the ‘learner’ in this experiment was actually a confederate who never really
experienced any actual electric shocks. However, in some versions o f the experiment,
at a certain magnitude (seventy-five volts), a recording was played for each
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increasing shock intensity that voiced the learner’s growing distress mixed with
complaints about a heart condition (which were clearly audible to the participant),
before these would fall silent at the three-hundred and forty-five volt level. O f the
people that M ilgram surveyed (1974, p. 27-31) about the experiment, none o f them
said that they would continue shocking to the very end o f the experiment if they had
been participants. And when asked how many people they believed would continue to
shock right through to the end o f the experiment, the general prediction was two
percent or less. However, and this is likely why Milgram’s experiments stirred up
such a controversy, throughout numerous replications and similar experiments, the
general findings can be expressed as obtaining roughly two thirds complete
obedience. That is to say that, on average, between sixty to seventy percent o f
participants “shocked” the learner all the way to the final four-hundred and fifty volt
level. Such results are staggering and stand in marked contrast to what people would
commonly assume to be the social behavioural norm. Indeed, Harman thinks that for
most people who encounter these results, “it is hard not to think there is something
terribly wrong with the subject [i.e. participant]” and that “it is extremely tempting to
attribute the subject’s performance to a character defect in the subject rather than to
details o f the situation” (2000a, p. 171). However, for Harman, such tendencies
simply amount to being illustrations of the fundamental attribution error mentioned
earlier— that is, the erroneous tendency to find fault with the individual rather than
recognize the force the situation has upon behaviour. So how, according to
situationists, is one to interpret such intuitively challenging results?
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According to Doris, it is unlikely that these experiments tapped into a sinister
segment o f the normal population in America, or that people are generally cruel
(2002, p. 42). Rather, he cautions that, “trait-contrary behaviour does not necessarily
signal the possession o f a contrary trait; even active failures o f compassion do not
necessarily imply sadism” (2002, p. 42). Instead, what these experiments suggest for
Doris is that, once again, the situation has displayed a serious power to affect human
behaviour. In this case, the mere presence and directions o f an experimenter were
enough to influence participants to commit very destructive behaviours.
Certainly, there are various reasons advanced by critics o f these experiments
to doubt that they reflect a ‘real-world’ phenomenon o f destructive obedience. For
example, at first glance, it appears absurd that anyone would be so powerfully
influenced by such simple and non-threatening directives as those voiced by the
experimenter; and thus, some have suggested that most of the participants must have
known that the shocks were not real. However, for Doris, such situations are not
without their analogs in other social and organizational contexts; for example, in the
military, in fraternities, and in street gangs, various rituals (presumably hazings and
the like), take place that maintain a similar dynamic, and these are taken very
seriously by the people involved (2002, p. 43). Furthermore, Doris paraphrases
M ilgram’s observation that, “the best evidence for the experimental realism o f [tjhis
paradigm is the extraordinary anxiety o f the subjects, amply documented by
experimental transcripts” (2002, p. 43). Indeed, according to Milgram, subjects were
noted to “sweat, tremble, stutter, bite their lips, groan, and dig their fingernails into
their flesh” (as cited in Doris, p.42-3). For Doris, this means that many subjects were
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deeply conflicted about what they were doing. That is to say, many o f them displayed
an obvious discomfort with their required actions, but nevertheless, the majority
continued to follow instructions though to the highest level o f shock— a result that
remains deeply telling about the overriding power o f the situation.
Doris similarly rejects claims to the effect that the participants were assured o f
the safety o f the experiment by an implicit confidence derived from the esteem they
had for the institutional setting (2002, p. 44). That is to say, he does not believe that
any internalized sense o f trust in the prestige o f the experimental locale, nor in the
competence o f the experimenter, were sufficient to alert the majority o f the
participants that the shocks were not real, especially since about a year after the study,
eighty percent o f six hundred former participants responded to a questionnaire that
they were either certain or thought it likely that the shocks were real (p. 43).
Furthermore, the institutional setting was shown not to have any notable influence,
since at one point the experiment was moved off o f the university campus to an
apparently less prestigious locale and still maintained similar results. Moreover, in
regards to the apparent competence o f the experimenter (also advanced as a possible
implicit clue to the experiment’s deception), a modified version o f the experiment
was developed by another group who intentionally made the experimenter appear
surprised with what was taking place— the results were ninety-one percent obedience
(p. 44). Therefore, for Doris, the suggestion that the participants knew about the
deception all along and were merely play-acting simply does not hold up to scrutiny.
Rather, he claims, “there are numerous reasons to think that widespread obedience
may obtain with credulous subjects” (2002, p. 45).
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This obedience, according to Doris, rather than by appealing to differences in
character, is best understood in terms o f situational factors. And this is because, the
degree to which participants were found to be obedient was highly similar across
similarly structured experimental situations; however, where the experimental
situation was changed, there was a corresponding change in the degree o f obedience
obtained. For example, when participants were allowed to decide for themselves just
how intense a shock they were willing to administer, only three percent opted to
shock to the highest level. And when the experimenter was removed from the room
only to give instructions by phone, there was also a significant drop in obedience.
These and other examples prompted Doris to claim that, “the variation in obedience
across experimental conditions— from near negligible to near total— is powerful
evidence that situational variation can swamp individual differences” (2002, p. 46). In
other words, explanations o f these kinds o f experimental results that appeal to
personality or character differences pale in comparison to situationist accounts, since
the latter provide a much more informative and accurate account o f the reasons for
the noted variation in behaviour. However, Doris does admit that since the
experiments did not obtain total behavioural conformity from all participants,
“individual dispositional differences must be doing some o f the work” (2002, p. 46).
However, he considers attempts to relate personality measures to obedience scores to
be generally unimpressive.
According to Doris, what may be more important to securing obedience than
the presence o f a perceived authority figure is the notion that it is the authority figure
that bears responsibility for one’s actions in these kinds of instances. Indeed, in

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

22

Milgram’s study, the experimenter was noted to provide assurances to that effect on
occasion (Doris, 2002, p. 50). Furthermore, as cited by Doris, M ilgram ’s later survey
revealed that the obedient participants considered themselves less responsible than
did the disobedient participants. However, such considerations cannot be taken as
providing a complete account the behavioural obedience in question, since those who
did obey still felt themselves at least partially responsible— as was evidenced by the
physical signs o f stress that were displayed.
Maybe it was the gradual nature o f the experiment that was responsible for
securing obedience since the decision to stop at any particular point is hindered by the
previous decision to proceed at a shock level only one degree lower in severity.
Others have noted that this creates a “justification problem” (Doris, 2002, p. 50); that
is, if the participant eventually decides to stop, she is then faced with the issue o f
trying to justify what made the previous shock acceptable but not the one at which
she stopped. This idea has some support in the sense that, the point at which most
people became disobedient was when the learner first voiced their desire to withdraw
from the experiment— this provides the justification to stop for the participant.
However, Doris speculates that the varying degrees o f shock intensity listed upon the
shock device panel should have provided similar opportunities to justify stopping
since it seems plausible that some could have used these labels to justify disobedience
(for example, that they may be fine with administering a ‘strong shock’ but not a
‘very strong shock’) (p. 50). Therefore, for Doris, such an analysis must be treated
carefully since, like the notion o f the partial relief o f responsibility mentioned
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previously, it appears only capable o f providing a partial account o f the observed
behaviour.

1.5 Situationist Motivations

For the situationist, what the types o f experiments mentioned in this chapter
reveal is the failure o f characterological conceptions to adequately account for the
observed differences in behaviour— especially where behaviours are shown to differ
markedly in connection with differing situational variables (even where these
situational variables’ power to influence is not recognized by the participants
themselves). Moreover, all three o f the experiments reviewed can be seen to
undermine the notion o f the stability o f character as it is expressed in the disposition
of compassion. In other words, all three experimental settings appeared to have
provided plausible and relevant eliciting conditions wherein one would expect people
with compassionate characters to behave in very specific ways; namely, to be helpful,
or not to cause harm. However, as was demonstrated, the tendency to help or to
ignore and to harm or to not harm was powerfully influenced by differing aspects of
the situation. Therefore, to appeal to differences in the character types o f the
participants (i.e. their compassionate dispositions) in order to explain their behaviour,
would be to ignore the much more accurate and informative explanation that is
provided by taking the power o f the situational factors seriously.
In other words, one may attempt to explain the results o f these experiments in
a way that preserves character based conclusions; for example, one might suggest that
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in the obedience experiments those who did not shock the learner to the full amount
have more compassionate characters than those who did shock to the very limit.
However, such a strategy, though it may preserve the notion o f character, does not
explain why the behaviour o f the participants varied so drastically with changes in the
experimental situation; for example, in the variants o f the obedience studies wherein
the experimenter gave instructions by phone or allowed the participants to choose the
level o f shock they would administer for themselves— characterological accounts
cannot make sense o f the resulting significant drop in harmful behaviour as compared
with the experimental results o f the original design. In these instances, the only
answer that a characterological account can provide is to the effect that the different
versions o f the experiment just so happened to arrive at the specific distributions of
compassionate and uncompassionate character types that they did by chance alone.
However, the greater the number o f experiments that share compatible findings
among differing experimental contexts and their results, the less plausible such a view
becomes. Furthermore, according to both D&H, there exists already a wealth o f
experimental evidence that confirms the situationist position and leaves
characterological explanations seriously wanting.
Indeed, for D&H, it is not just the experimental designs reviewed in this paper
that motivate situationism; rather, they argue that these experiments are
“representative o f established trends” in the experimental literature and that
“situationism is motivated by a pattern o f results, not the results o f any particular
study” (Doris, 2002, p. 35). Furthermore, according to Harman, “No one supposes
that these [three] experiments, taken by themselves, show that there are no character
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traits”; what they do show, however, is that when observers attribute the noted
variations in behaviour to character dispositions, “the observers are wrong: that
cannot be the explanation” (2003, p. 90-91). They are wrong because these sorts of
attributions do not adequately explain the said behavioural variation, that is, across
the varying experimental conditions.
The results o f this large body o f experimental data lead Doris to conclude that,
“the empirical evidence indicates that compassion relevant behavior is far more
situationally variable than the globalist theses [i.e. character based notions] o f
consistency and evaluative integration would have us believe” (2002, p. 61). So
although we may think that an individual’s tendency to behave compassionately (or in
a way that might suggest some other disposition), is a result o f their particular
character, such behaviours, on the situationist score, are more accurately the results of
various situational factors. The preceding leads Doris to conclude that, “Globalism is
an empirically inadequate account o f human functioning” (2002, p. 61). And again
more boldly for Harman that, “Since it is possible to explain our ordinary belief in
character traits as deriving from certain illusions, we must conclude that there is no
empirical basis for the existence o f character traits” (2000a, p. 166). Thus we have the
main thrust o f the situationist argument— empirical results from a multitude o f
experiments do not support the traditional understanding o f character, which leads
situationists to suggest that it should be abandoned.
But it is not simply the experimental results that sustain situationism (although
these are certainly keystone to the position); there are also indicators in more true to
life contexts that betray the overwhelming power o f the situation. For example, Doris
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mentions the extraordinary internal conflict that must have been experienced by the
doctors who worked in the Nazi concentration camps during W orld W ar Two (2002,
p. 53-8). Many o f these doctors, he claims, had the onerous task o f deciding which of
the arrivals would be forced to work in the camps but live, and which would be killed
immediately (p. 54). These doctors originally made the choice to dedicate themselves
to a profession that aims to save lives, and yet their death camp duties were in direct
opposition to such aims. That people are capable o f such acts can be mind boggling;
however, there is reason to believe that various situational factors were responsible
for facilitating such aberrant behaviour. Indeed, according Lifton (1986), as
paraphrased by Doris,

The Auschwitz doctors underwent an intensive socialization process in order to effect
their “adaptation” to life in the death-world o f the camp. Doctors frequently drank
heavily together and often expressed dissatisfaction with camp practices, but these
protests eventuated in group rationalizations; the alcoholic therapy sessions were a
means for the doctors to establish consensual validation for behaviours that were
strongly dissonant with precamp values. (2002, p. 56)

None o f this, for Doris, is to deny the facts: the doctors committed some
monstrous acts, but it is not clear that they would have all behaved in such despicable
ways had there been no situational facilitation o f their conduct, for example, in the
form o f “alcoholic therapy sessions” and the like. Furthermore, previous to and
outside o f the camp life, there is little reason to think that these people were utterly
evil. After all, they were doctors, some o f whom had families to which they were
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devoted and, according to Doris, “A plausible conjecture, just as with the Milgram
obedients.. is that a very substantial percentage o f perpetrators in the holocaust had
previously led lives characterized by ordinary levels o f compassion” (2002, p. 54). So
once again, we are left with the image o f the overwhelming power o f the situational
context to override individual dispositions and their presumed efficacy.
Harman warns that there are further negative consequences to thinking in
terms o f character based dispositions (though he does little by way o f justifying his
views on these points). For example, he believes that misattributions o f character
result in failures o f political reasoning, and misjudgments o f the actions o f others.
Moreover, he believes that, “in extreme cases, [these misjudgments] lead to ethnic
warfare” (2003, p. 421), since they take the place o f a rational understanding o f the
common struggle by various groups for limited resources (2000a, p. 177). He also
thinks that programs for moral education are misguided where they rely upon the
notion o f character development, since, according to him, there is no evidence that
character exists.
There are however, alternatives to the situationist interpretation o f both the
empirical research done in psychology and the underlying factors that motivate
significant world events. In the next chapter, I will review the arguments o f several
philosophers who are in various ways critical o f the situationist interpretations, most
o f whom argue against situationist conclusions and their prescription that the
commonplace notion o f character be abandoned. And later, in section 3 .4 ,1 will
contribute an argument to the debate that I believe should persuade the situationists to
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reevaluate their position, or at least, to recognize the limited scope o f application as
well as the limited realm o f warranted inferences provided by the psychological data.
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2.0 Situationism Scrutinized

Many o f the philosophers who have taken issue with the situationist position
have done so in an attempt to save traditional views o f virtue ethics from falling out
o f favor and into obscurity. At the very least, it is certain that many o f these
philosophers acknowledge that, when understood in a particular way, the empirical
studies referenced by the situationists may seem to be a serious problem for virtue
ethics. Nevertheless, few agree that the results o f these studies warrant that virtue
ethics or notions o f character be abandoned completely, and some even contend that
they are no real threat to virtue ethics or character at all. Indeed, as was mentioned
earlier, there are alternative interpretive accounts available o f the implications o f the
empirical data. Furthermore, although some o f these alternative readings may differ
in their approach to formulating a response to situationism, most agree that, as it
stands, the data upon which the situationists rely do not alone provide sufficient
warrant for the abandonment o f virtue ethics and character. Indeed, it seems that most
who are critical o f the situationist position would agree with John Sabini and Maury
Silver that, in this case, the situationist “philosophers and psychologists have drawn
wrong conclusions from psychological results...[and that,].. .the lesson to be learned
is substantially narrower than the movement seems to believe” (2005, p. 535).
Since many o f the refutations o f situationism have been motivated by attempts
to defend virtue ethics, much o f the talk about character is situated in the larger
context o f how character relates to virtue; and as such, though this chapter will
primarily focus upon the defense o f character, several o f the arguments presented will
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make reference to the implications o f character for virtue ethics. But this should come
as no surprise, nor should it confound the aim o f this thesis, since the popular
understanding of character has been derived from Aristotelian notions; and for
Aristotle, the virtues are “states o f character” (Kaplan [Ed.], 1958, p .188).
According to Christian Miller (2003, p.367)— a critic o f the situationist
interpretations o f D&H— the situationist account o f character falls short o f providing
a sufficiently detailed understanding o f just what a character trait is. For Harman,
character traits are broad-based, relatively stable and long-term dispositions or habits
to act in specific ways, and these dispositions may be evoked to explain certain
aspects of a person’s behaviour. However, as Miller notes, such a classification fails
to exclude persistent behaviours such as smoking, alcoholism, bulimic purging, and
many other stable dispositions that most would not count as character traits. The
potential for ambiguity in regards to ‘trait-terms’ and their perceived relevance to the
notion o f character has also been recognized by Richard Brandt, who claims, “It may
be objected that the suggested dichotomy o f personality-trait-terms into those
designating traits o f moral character and others is questionable, and [that] there is no
reasonably definite intuitively acceptable class o f names o f traits o f moral character”
(1970, p. 24). Nevertheless, Harman’s characterization is similar to the one provided
by Doris. More importantly, both philosophers take the general expectation for the
behavioural consistency o f agents within the appropriate eliciting conditions to be one
o f the more central and distinguishing features o f character. Indeed, according to
Gopal Sreenivasan, “the mainstay o f situationism’s critique consists in the claim that
people’s behaviour is not cross-situationally consistent” (2002, p.51). Thus, it is in
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regards to the preceding claim— and more importantly, what the research has to say
about it—that the views o f both D&H will be challenged in this chapter.
The challenge to character-eliminativist situationism will be advanced on
several fronts: from alternative interpretations regarding the implications o f the
experimental data and arguments about character development and training, to the
incompleteness o f the situationist understanding o f character. Furthermore, the
importance o f the perspective o f the individual, both in terms o f subjective self
appraisals and the practical reasoning aimed at the achievement o f the good life, will
be brought to light in order to expose some o f the inadequacies o f situationist theory
and interpretations o f research. Indeed, by the end o f this chapter, the limitations o f
the situationist project for the elimination o f character should be clear and obvious.

2.1 Non-Situationist Interpretations

In regards to Harman’s interpretation o f the results o f the Milgram obedience
experiments, Miller argues that, “it is not at all clear what implications they are
supposed to have with respect to the issue o f the existence o f global [i.e. robust]
character traits” (2003, p. 369). First, Harman does not mention what specific yet
absent character trait should be relevant to the situation. Nor does he attempt to
explain the behaviour o f those participants who did disobey the directives. It would
seem, according to Miller, that since all o f the participants were in the same
situational context, the disobedience o f some o f them must have been due to some
internal disposition, for example, that they have more compassionate character types.
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(See Doris’ claim to the same effect in the previous chapter, section 1.4; and note his
dismissive treatment o f this point.) Thus, according to Miller, “the results that
Harman takes to be a reductio o f character-based explanations, may actually turn out
to be precisely what one should expect on a sufficiently nuanced understanding o f
virtue ethics” (2003, p. 370). In other words, such an account o f virtue ethics takes
note o f just how uncommon truly virtuous agents are thought to be. What this means
for the idea o f character, is that the findings o f social psychological studies, like those
of Milgram, may actually be interpreted as supportive o f characterological
conceptions, so long as the understanding o f character one is working with is
comparable to how it is conceived within a sufficiently sophisticated account o f the
virtues. Moreover, even if one is not attempting to explain the behaviour o f the
Milgram study participants in the context o f a theory o f virtue, one may simply
conclude, according to Sabini and Silver, that, “people value obeying authority more
than we thought they did” (2005, p. 547); and this remains a reasonable interpretive
strategy o f the results which poses no threat to the idea o f character. Furthermore, that
some individuals might ‘value obeying authority’ could in fact turn out to be due to
their being in possession o f a more general underlying character disposition: that they
have obedient character types. And thus, far from dispelling the notion o f character,
in this case, situationist research seems to have brought to light a hitherto neglected
aspect o f it.
With respect to the previously illustrated Darley and Batson study, which
focused in part on the effects o f time-stress upon helping behaviour, Miller argues, “it
seems reasonable to think that we should focus on the students’ internal dispositions
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in order to predict the outcome o f this experiment only if we had strong antecedent
reasons for believing that the majority o f the test subjects possessed the relevant
global character trait(s) to begin with” (2003, p. 371). However, for Miller, these
reasons are not forthcoming, and the vocational trajectory o f the students is not
enough to warrant the assumption that they have all obtained the requisite character
trait o f compassion. Indeed, contrarily to what might be expected o f those in religious
professions— namely, that they be kind and compassionate— history stands as a
record that is filled with anecdotes o f cruel and cold-hearted nuns as well as
criminally perverted pederast priests. Moreover, for other lines o f work, we have no
reason to suspect that particular character traits are related in any strong way to job
choice; for instance, it would be unreasonable to think that all polygraph operators
never lie (or take themselves to be perfectly honest), or that no police officers have
ever stolen money from any o f the criminals they placed in custody. So a person’s
choice o f profession does not alone guarantee that they would possess a given
character trait. Thus, according to Miller, “it seems only natural that we would also
want to take situational considerations into account” (2003, p. 371).
But even where we do have reason to believe that people possess the character
trait in question, we have no reason to assume that such character traits might not on
occasion be overridden by other concerns (or character traits), such as the urgency o f
the obligation to report to the second phase o f a study for which one has made a
commitment to attend. Indeed, as noted by Rachana Kamtekar, “the seminarians in
the Darley and Batson experiment were faced with competing demands for help, from
the experimenters and from the person in the doorway [i.e. the confederate]: it was in
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the course o f helping the experimenters that they were called upon to help the person
in the doorway. W homever they helped, they would also have been failing to help
someone and so displaying inconsistently helpful behaviour” (2004, p. 473). Thus, a
single character trait may be burdened by multiple demands; where this is the case we
cannot reasonably assume that a failure to act on one o f the demands counts as
discontinuing evidence against the character trait in question.
It is in response to the same study by Darley and Batson that Sabini and Silver
raise an important concern about how people rate the moral demands o f the situations
in which they find themselves. They ask, “shouldn’t the subjects see that one [moral
obligation] is more important than the other” (2005, p. 558 footnote); namely, the
obligation to help the person in distress over the obligation to report to the study?
And perhaps they should. However, the general reluctance o f participants in the ‘high
hurry’ condition to stop and help the confederate is not necessarily a failure to act
morally (since they are still ‘helpful’ to the experimenter), but rather, it is a failure to
identify the most morally demanding feature o f one’s environment; and as such,
although they may experience difficulties in discerning which obligation to act upon,
this does not necessarily mean that they are acting out o f character or without regard
for moral demands. Thus, although the ability to distinguish which moral action is
most required remains an important concern, it is not a concern which directly
challenges the idea that people have character types.
There are additional concerns, however, that are raised by experimental
constructs like the one o f Darley and Batson; namely, that the introduction o f a timestress variable may produce more than one character subverting effect, and some of
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these effects may be taken to be quite reasonable conditions for, or even inevitably
lead to, the absence o f character relevant displays o f behaviour. For example, time
stress can have a varying degree o f impact upon an individual’s scope o f attention and
reflective capacity; for example, within the Darley and Batson study, failure to assist
the confederate might have more to do with the fact that he was not well noticed, or
his distress not accurately identified, than it does with a failure to act from a
designated character disposition.
Attention may also be influenced by affective and mood states. For instance,
according to Brandt, “character-traits are very like intellectual capacity; a person with
a high I.Q. may, in a state o f emotion, do very poorly on a standard test. And
emotional disturbance may affect the influence any need/aversion may have on
action” (1970, p. 35). So an individual who is dealing with turbulent emotions may
occasionally fail to notice various aspects o f morally demanding situations, or even
that a situation is o f moral concern. In cases where the moral failing is a minor one,
we would normally excuse it on the grounds that the individual was emotionally
disturbed, rather than judge an individual to be inconsistent in, for example, their
regard for others. Mood states, like affective states, can similarly have a significant
impact on attention, although as Sabini and Silver note, “being in a bad mood does
not excuse the failure to notice screams o f agony and the like, but it is the sort o f
thing that excuses the failure to notice some dropped pencils (or papers as in the Isen
and Levin study).. .[thus].. .the fact that people are inconsistent in whether they pick
up (or not) depending on their mood is not sufficient inconsistency to warrant
abandoning virtue ethics” (2005, p. 540). Here the point is made powerfully clear: it
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would take much more than the failure to act with courtesy to disconfirm the kind o f
character described by traditional virtue ethics, since this failure could be excused for
the attentional reasons mentioned above. But we might not take these same reasons to
excuse more powerfully demanding situational cues, for example, as in cases where
people appear to be in significant physical danger or distress (e.g. the Milgram
studies). Helping someone to pick-up some dropped papers hardly seems like a
paradigm case o f compassionate behaviour. Thus, where the intention is to challenge
the existence o f a particular trait o f character, employing paradigm examples would
appear necessary to secure more powerful and compelling results.
These arguments notwithstanding, Miller agrees with Harman that there is in
fact persuasive experimental support for the view that people typically over
emphasize the internal dispositions o f others at the cost o f failing to acquire realistic
appraisals o f the behavioural influence o f situational factors, otherwise known as the
tendency to make the fundamental attribution error. However, this fact simply does
not pose a threat to virtue ethics or the notion o f character since, “nothing follows
about the existence o f character traits in general from the tendency o f psychology test
subjects.. .to fall prey to this error” (2003, p. 371). Or as Sreenivasan claims, “the
fundamental attribution error is irrelevant to the question o f whether anyone really
has a character trait” (2002, p. 53-53). Indeed, Miller encourages philosophers to
become familiar with the experimental literature since they may discover ways to
counteract this tendency towards error. It is, after all, as Sreenivasan notes, a simple
failure to, “appreciate.. .that the reliability o f their predictions depends upon the
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number [and distribution] o f observations underlying their trait attribution” (2002, p.
52[53]). And such failures, it seems, ought to admit of correction.
But Harman does not merely cite the experimental evidence regarding the
fundamental attribution error to lend support to his view, while maintaining that the
social psychological research on things like helping behaviour and obedience
confirms his position, he also suggests that there is no empirical support for the view
that global character traits even exist. However, as noted by M iller (2003), even if
one were to grant that Harman’s interpretations are correct, and that he could develop
his argument that the findings do not support the idea o f global character traits, his
analysis remains restricted to an examination o f the results from only the field o f
social psychology. What would be required to show that there is no empirical support
for the idea o f global character traits is that there is either no other source o f empirical
evidence that may be supportive o f the idea, or that if any number o f other sources of
empirical evidence may be available, these must all fail to provide support for the
notion o f global traits (p. 372-3). However, Harman provides no such argument.
Moreover, even within the psychological literature, Harman failed to notice at least
one very promising method in character research that has been empirically validated;
namely, the template-matching technique developed by Daryl Bern and David Funder
(1983, p. 203). Indeed, according to Bern, “the standard template-matching procedure
has proven to be versatile and empirically successfid [italics added] both as a tool of
verification and o f exploration” (1983, p. 208). In other words, the template matching
procedure is successful with respect to its ability to predict character relevant
behaviours across situations and for personality theory testing respectively. So, in
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short, it would appear that Harman’s statement regarding the lacking o f empirical
support for character is simply false.

2.2 Consistency and Character Development

Perhaps one o f the most powerful objections (and maybe even most obvious)
to the situationist position is that, even if one is committed to the view that there are
such things as global character traits, it does not follow that one accepts that these
traits must be behaviourally evidenced in every single instance in which one might
possibly expect them to arise. In other words, the experimental evidence gathered by
situationists is really only threatening, if it is threatening at all, to those who hold a
very strong view regarding the required consistency o f an agent’s behaviour in order
for the agent to be thought to possess a certain type o f character. M iller (2003)
captures this point well:

[The current social psychological findings] will count against the virtue ethicist [or
characterological conceptions] only i f her view is committed to an extremely strong
account o f character traits according to which an agent has a particular global trait T
only if he attempts to perform the relevant T-sortal act in every T-eliciting
circumstance. But I can see no reason why any virtue ethical theory [or conception o f
character] should be saddled with such an implausible account. For it has rarely been
part o f the view that possession o f a virtue [or character trait] is an all or nothing
phenomenon; rather, it com es in degrees. In addition, acquiring a particular virtue [or
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character type] is typically thought to be a very gradual process full o f numerous
setbacks, (p. 378)

Allow me to draw an informative analogy: learning to be virtuous or to have a
robust kind o f character is, in a sense, like learning to swim. Situational factors may
affect both. For example, just as certain conditions (e.g. high waves, very cold water,
and complete darkness) can have a serious impact upon an individual’s ability to
swim well, especially if they are still learning how to swim, so too can various
situational conditions (e.g. time stress, the presence o f an authority figure, et cetera)
impair character relevant behaviours while the character type is still developing. But
just as the frantic splashing that results from placing someone who is just learning to
swim into a freezing cold pool o f high waves in utter darkness does not mean that the
person cannot swim (or leam to swim under more favorable early conditions), neither
can the influence o f the various situational factors mentioned be taken to prove that
an individual has no character (or that the individual would be incapable o f
developing one in more conducive early settings).
Indeed, most would agree that the formation o f a character type or trait
involves a learned and sustained process o f development, and that throughout this
process an agent may occasionally fail to express the appropriate character trait for a
number o f different reasons. But this shift in understanding from a situationist
perspective to a more realistic and more widely accepted view o f character—one in
which it is seen as a developmental process that allows for some error or
inconsistency— highlights another serious problem for situationist interpretations:
namely, that the experimental research upon which they commonly rely does not
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address the issue o f the development o f character. That is to say, that the experimental
programs cited by situationists are not longitudinal studies, and as such, they cannot
begin to address the question o f whether or not ‘global’ character traits exist since the
experiments cited do not attempt to track repetitions or patterns o f specific
behaviours, but rather, only deal with isolated instances o f behaviour. This point is
crucial, and it creates a serious counter problem for the situationist view that the there
is no empirical reason to assume that global character traits exist and that, therefore,
the traditional conception o f character ought to be abandoned. In the first place, this
counter problem shows that the empirical research cited by situationists is not up to
the task o f showing whether or not global character traits exist-—to do this would
require that longitudinal studies be done. Thus, it is no wonder that Harman finds no
empirical support for global character traits since he is not even looking in the right
place for it. Secondly, it shows that the experimental research employed by the
situationists is insufficient to warrant the abandonment o f characterological
conceptions since the studies cited do not directly challenge the general notion o f
character.
As noted by Miller, even the most generous appraisal o f the situationist
argument from empirical research should only result in the view that most o f the
individuals studied in the cited experiments did not possess fully cultivated character
traits; and according to him, “virtue ethicists can readily agree that some experiments
in social psychology confirm that there currently is not widespread full possession of
global character traits” (2003, p. 379). They can concede this point without worry
since most virtue ethical theories take the virtues (and the character types associated
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with them), to be rarely achieved, and difficult to fully acquire. Thus, they are not
committed to the expectation that their manifestations be unfalteringly observable in
the actions o f the average person. Or as Sreenivasan puts it, “if a theory o f virtue only
applies in the first instance to ‘some people’, then its empirical presuppositions are
not falsified [by the data put forward by situationists] unless it is really true that next
to no one’s (virtue) traits are cross-situationally consistent” (2002, p. 57). So even if
the people who display the appropriate kind o f behavioural consistency are in the
minority, traditional virtue theory and conceptions o f character can still withstand the
situationist challenge.
What this means, for Miller, is that, “rather than disconfirming virtue ethics,
social psychologists have to some extent provided supporting evidence for certain
traditionally prominent features o f the view” (2003, p. 379). One prominent feature
being just how unlikely it is to encounter an individual who has obtained full virtue,
or a fully developed character type. Moreover, as Nafsika Athanassoulis (2000)
argues, that a virtuous character type be fully developed by anyone may be
exceedingly rare or even unnecessary for sustaining virtue ethical theory— since, in so
far as an ethical theory is intended to guide moral action, it may still succeed in this
by employing the individual o f virtuous character as an ideal from which to guide
one’s actions in uncertain yet morally demanding situations, regardless o f whether or
not such a fully virtuous individual actually exists (p. 217).
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2.3 Empirical Considerations

Even without reference to the virtues, many would likely allow that an
individual may act ‘out o f character’ on a given occasion without such an admission
necessarily leading to the suspicion that the person’s typical behaviours are widely
inconsistent or telling against a more settled disposition. As noted by Miller, “in some
cases o f character trait attribution, individuals with those traits might fail to meet
certain expectations in particularly demanding circumstances. Nonetheless, character
traits could still be important causal factors in an explanation for why those people
behave the way they do in most ordinary [italics added] situations” (2003, p. 380381). So it would seem that the experimental results cited by situationists (e.g. the
Milgram studies), need not be considered to be radically counterintuitive in regards to
the generally held views on character. Rather, where intuitions regarding the expected
behaviour o f participants in experimental contexts have been recorded, they seem
more likely to signal instances o f the fundamental attribution error or unjustified
character attributions than the inadequacy o f characterological conceptions to make
sense of human action. After all, characterological conceptions o f action are widely
held to allow for some flexibility in the face o f various pressures.
Although allowing the concept o f character such flexibility may appear to
render it irrefutable, this is in fact not the case. The question may still be settled on
empirical grounds. However, this can only be reasonably accomplished by way o f
longitudinal research, since such a method allows individuals and their behaviours to
be tracked over time, and thus may provide a ‘global’ image o f character or its
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absence. If such a method reveals that there is little to no consistency in the average
individual’s reactions to various deeply similar situations that would generally be
predicted to elicit character relevant behaviour o f a certain type, then the case against
character is bolstered considerably. However, and this point is a serious concern for
situationists, such behavioural inconsistency across very similar eliciting situations is
also telling against situationism, since the situation, in this case, would be unable to
achieve behavioural conformity as well. In other words, if participants are reacting
inconsistently to very similar situational cues, then the view that a ‘situational force’
is responsible for motivating behaviour is undermined. This is because, in order for a
situational factor to be considered responsible for motivating certain behaviours, it
must produce the same behavioural effect in a highly reliable manner. This is not to
say that acquiring compelling empirical support for situationism is not possible, but
rather, that it requires carefully developed research programs. For example, as was
noted with the variants o f the Milgram study, intentionally slight situational variations
across generally similar experimental conditions did have significant effects.
However, what would be required to render such results more convincing (and
supportive o f the situationist position), would be for such experiments to employ the
same group o f subjects across the various trials in order to track the behavioural
effects o f the subtle situational manipulations against the presumed efficacy o f their
individual characters.
Should such refined forms o f longitudinal research on character occur, I am
inclined to expect reasonably high levels o f individual consistency ratings across
multiple and similar character eliciting situations for at least some participants— since
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even the demanding pressures o f the Milgram studies did not obtain total obedience—
and this is all that the standard views on character or virtue would require. However,
even if the experimental designs reached the stage o f refinement previously
mentioned, one would still need to retain a critical attitude in regards to the ‘slight’
situational manipulations involved. The reason is that in some cases, one might
encounter an experimental condition commonly taken to be capable o f overriding
character that is masquerading as a subtle manipulation that character should be able
to withstand. In other words, just what renders an experimental manipulation a
‘slight’ one would need to be given serious attention; that is, how these potential
slight manipulations are characterized and interpreted must be the object o f careful
scrutiny. Otherwise some o f the experimental results may be taken to count against
character where in fact they ought not to. With these measures in place, however, it
seems reasonable to think that the suggested form o f experimental design could be
capable o f bringing the debate over character closer to a realistic resolution.

2.4 Character Training

Another important response to the situationist position remains: namely, that
even if most people are found lacking in regards to a longitudinally testable global
personality or character trait, this finding alone does not mean that people are
incapable o f developing the traits in question through the appropriate training. Indeed
the descriptive ‘is’ o f the results o f social psychological research need not necessarily
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dictate the normative limits o f human potential. For example, with respect to the Isen
and Levin study that dealt with mood effects on helping behaviour, M iller argues,

Someone who defends the existence o f global character traits need only argue that most
o f the test subjects did not receive an adequate moral education which habituated them
into both recognizing and responding to the demands o f the situation. I f they had
received such a training, then their activation thresholds would have been lower; they
would not have needed the event o f finding a dime to trigger an internal feedback
mechanism which disposed them to helping behavior. (2003, p.385)

Indeed, where individuals fail to meet the requisite experimental expectations
for trait consistency, the question o f previous training and the adequacy o f the method
o f character inculcation remains a non-trivial one; this is largely due to the fact that
the achievement o f a fully developed character type is considered by many to be quite
difficult to attain, and that it requires much effort and conviction. So the absence of
trait-relevant behaviour has yet another alternative assessment available; namely, a
lacking or poorly implemented program o f character inculcation. Thus, even if truly
disconfirming evidence were produced, defenders o f character and virtue would
retain the ability to stave off the findings o f empirical research, at least until such
research is performed on well trained subjects.
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2.5 An Incomplete Account of Character

Another important argument against situationism reveals that the kinds o f
experiments typically employed against character and virtue do not adequately
capture the richness o f the concept o f character as it is normally understood within
virtue ethical theories. Indeed, such a position is taken by Kamtekar, who argues that,
“traditional virtue ethics offers a conception o f character far superior to the one under
attack from situationism .. .the conception o f character in virtue ethics is holistic and
inclusive o f how we reason: it is a person’s character as a whole (rather than isolated
character traits), that explains her actions, and this character is a more or less
consistent, more or less integrated, set o f motivations, including the person’s desires,
beliefs about the world, and ultimate goals and values” (2004, p. 460). Kamtekar’s
recognition that a more dynamic process o f practical reason is involved in motivating
the actions o f the virtuous agent is consistent with Aristotle’s additional conditions,
mentioned in the introduction o f this thesis (section 1.0), concerning knowledge and
choice. Moreover, not only does it obtain a more comprehensive compatibility with
Aristotelian views on virtue, but Kamtekar’s position allows for a conceptually richer
understanding o f character, one that involves much more than is captured by the
notions o f character provided within standard situationist accounts. For example,
where situationists see some behaviours as simply counting against their limited
concept o f character, views like Kamtekar’s allow for those behaviours to be assessed
in light o f the processes of reasoning proper to the individuals in question— and they
are not taken to undermine character in any way. Indeed, according to Kamtekar,
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“traditional virtue ethics explains behavioural inconsistency as a result o f the
cognitive and motivational obstacles to th[e] achievement o f practical reason rather
than as the result o f the absence o f character traits” (2004, p. 460).
But what is meant by the term ‘practical reason’, and how is it impeded?
According to Gary Weaver, practical wisdom (i.e. excellence o f a special kind o f
practical reasoning) is, “an actor’s ability to balance successfully the varied
requirements o f virtue encountered in the different venues o f life— work, home,
community, e tc.. .[it] involves skillful adjudication among th[e] virtues in light o f a
general sense o f ‘who I am ’ as a moral agent” (2006, p.358). So the kind o f practical
reason that we are concerned with demands that some deliberative effort be put into
one’s choices regarding opportunities to act virtuously and how these relate to one’s
self-concept— especially as concerns those opportunities that the agent immediately
faces. And as with normal deliberation, there are multiple factors that may serve to
aggravate the process; for example, time stress, an emotional disturbance, the
presence o f others, what one is attending to, et cetera.
Kamtekar’s understanding o f traditional virtue ethics leads to a very different
interpretation o f the current experimental results than the one provided by
situationists. For example, rather than taking the actions of the participants in the
Darley and Batson experiment as evidence against character, a person who sees
things as Kamtekar does, would be much more likely to interpret the behaviour o f
those who did not help to be the result o f the motivational impediment created by the
time stress variable; this is not to say that the situational pressures did not play a role,
but rather, that their impact upon behaviour does not directly disconfirm the existence
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o f character. Notice that this actually allows for a much more comprehensive
explanation o f behaviour— since, for situationists, the fact that some people
(statistical outliers) do help cannot be accounted for in terms o f situational factors yet,
on Kamtekar’s view, the behaviour o f both helpers and non-helpers can be explained
in reference to the degree o f impact that cognitive and motivational impediments have
on particular participants. Miller develops a similar position which he suggests,
“avoids the extremes o f crude situationism and naive trait dispositionalism [i.e. naive
endorsement o f character based explanations o f action],” by taking the view that, “it
is not situations alone which dictate action, but rather the ways in which we
selectively focus on and characterize various aspects o f them given our relatively
fixed personality structures” (2003, p. 384). So what we are seeing with both
Kamtekar and Miller is that there is a way in which the traditional notions o f
character and virtue can co-exist with the situation-sensitive findings from social
psychology. Therefore, one need not assume that the two perspectives are necessarily
incompatible.
A similar hybrid position known as ‘interactionism’ is also available in the
field o f psychology proper. As Bern perhaps too optimistically claims, “The apparent
contradiction between the personological view that behavior is person-determined
and transsituationally consistent and the situationist view that behavior is situationdetermined and context specific has now been resolved: We are all now
‘interactionists’” (1983, p. 203). Regardless of whether or not this position has truly
been widely adopted among researchers in psychology (based on my research this
seems doubtful), it nevertheless represents a more balanced approach to the study of
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personality or character in reference to situational demands, and thus, it is a useful
theoretical starting point for investigation into these matters.
The kind o f broader conceptual framework conceived o f by Kamtekar allows
for a significant contribution to be made by situationism, since situationist research
may help to identify the cognitive and motivational barriers to virtuous behaviour and
the development and support o f moral character types. Indeed as Kamtekar notes,
“virtue ethics can benefit from considering the particular situational factors that social
psychology suggests have a profound influence on behaviour... [especially as
concerns those].. .situations that do not wear their moral relevance on their sleeve but
nevertheless seem to constrain how we act” (2004, p. 461). In other words,
situationist research may help identify the influence upon behaviour o f various factors
not typically recognized by the individual. Moreover, such research would help to
secure predictions about group behavioural norms for various circumstances and, if
accepting of an account o f character and virtue like the one advanced by Kamtekar, it
would retain the advantage o f being able to explain the exceptions to those statistical
norms as well.
Nonetheless, to remain prudent with regards to examining the findings o f
situationist research is advisable, since the popularly cited studies on helping
behaviour recounted in the first section o f this paper (i.e. the Darley & Batson and
Isen & Levin studies), as noted by Kamtekar, “were only carried out on about forty
subjects, groups small enough to raise a question about how significant information
could be distinguished from noise” (2004, p. 466 footnote). So researchers need to be
sure to obtain adequate sample sizes, as well as have their studies replicated by other
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researchers before the results o f any particular study can be taken as representative of
established truths about behaviour, or be evaluated and weighted as such. Also,
philosophers and theoreticians need to be aware o f the experimental findings that lay
in opposition to, or seem to contradict their findings and pet theories (e.g. Bern’s
template-matching technique), since, as Miller argues, “it turns out that there is
actually a great deal o f experimental evidence th a t.. .local traits not only exist but are
in fact widely possessed” (2003, p. 382). These ‘local’ traits that M iller mentions may
not meet what situationists take to be the needs o f traditional virtue theories— that is,
they are not the robust characterological dispositions that might be expected— but,
they nevertheless provide evidence in support o f the consistency o f certain aspects of
character (albeit, in a more restricted sense). As such, they should act as a caution
against hasty claims (like Harman’s), to the effect that there is no empirical support
for character. Indeed, regardless o f their limited scope, such findings ought to
encourage further research and more refined methodologies rather than simply be
ignored or not recognized for what they in fact are: namely, character indexed
examples o f behavioural consistency.

2.6 Situationist Social Psychology Forgets the Individual

Another important personal dimension that seems to be given little if any
attention by situationists, and the research programs that they reference, are the
individual differences in the subjective construal o f the situation made by
participants. Indeed, as Sreenivasan notes, “it is one o f the hallmarks o f situationism
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to privilege objective behavioural measures in the assessment o f character traits, at
the expense o f various forms o f subjective assessment favoured by traditional
theorists o f personality— for example, self-reports, peer evaluations, and personality
assessment scales” (2002, p.50). O f course, this appears reasonable at first glance,
since the latter measures may not be the most reliable for predictive purposes, but it
nevertheless results in a failure to account for the participant’s own interpretation of
events. Thus, it would appear that social psychological researchers and situationists
generally assume that simply because they identify the relevant features o f an
experimental setting in a certain way, that the participants will uniformly take the
same interpretive perspective that they do. That is, that the participants will weigh
various objective aspects o f the situation in exactly the same manner as the
researchers. It would seem far more likely, however, that the participants— with their
varying background knowledge and perceptual acuities— in fact do not always
perceive the experimental context in the situationists’ desired fashion. Thus, as
Kamtekar points out, “supposed inconsistencies in behavior m ay not be [subjectively]
inconsistent at all” (2004, p.470). The following excerpt from Bern adds to the
picture:

The more important conceptual point to be made here is that social-psychological
theories.. .are, in fact, theories o f situations, typically formulated without reference to
individual differences. If personological theories have not lived up to expectations
because they have limited themselves to person effects in a world populated by personsituation interactions, then we should be no more sanguine about theories that limit
them selves to situation effects. (1983, p.207)
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So, just as the situationist may criticize the adequacy o f traditional personality
constructs for finding behavioural consistency across situations, the personality
theorist (i.e. advocate o f personality or character consistency), m ay challenge the
adequacy o f social psychological research methods to identify and incorporate
concerns related to individual differences and to take personality and character
seriously.
In connection with these last points lies a related concern; namely, it is
unclear just what are the situational forces deemed responsible by situationists for
overpowering the internal dispositions (i.e. character) o f individuals. Indeed, as noted
by Sabini & Silver, “the notion o f “situational forces” as an explanation.. .is not so
much wrong as it is vague” (2005, p. 558). Before much sense can be made about the
implications o f these situational forces their content needs to be precisely defined
(and Bern [1983] boasts that template-matching could serve such an end).
To illustrate the problem that this vagueness creates for situationists, take for
example the Isen and Levin study. For this study, the subjects who did help may not
have been in any way influenced by the presence o f the dime in the payphone return
slot, nor the presumed ‘good m ood’ that the dime was taken to instill in them. Indeed,
for a study construed as involving mood effects, surprisingly, nothing was known
about the actual mood states o f the participants, since these were not reported nor
recorded in any way. Yet the mere finding o f a dime was all that was required by the
experimenters to justify the attribution o f a ‘good m ood’ to a participant. Obviously,
such attributions are highly suspect, since it could have been that those who did help
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were in bad moods, or neutral ones, regardless o f their petty good fortune in finding
the dime. Perhaps the phone call they had just made ended in an argument or
conferred information about some other displeasing event; and yet, they may have
helped not because finding a dime lightened their mood, but simply because they
were taught good manners, or they so happened to have more compassionate
character types than those who did not help. Indeed, it might even have been the case
that those who did not help were in better moods than those who did help, since none
o f the participants were subsequently asked to comment on w hat kind o f mood they
were in prior to being involved in the experiment.
That such a serious oversight might occur in a study that is used as a
prominent example o f the need for situationist views to replace traditional notions o f
character inspires little confidence in the soundness o f the situationist position.
Rather, it seems to highlight the importance o f M iller’s suggestion that, “philosophers
should exercise a great deal o f care when employing data from social psychology as
independent evidence for their ethical claim s.. .[and that the analysis o f such
claim s],. .should be carried out on a case-by-case basis” (2003, p. 392). Moreover, if
these are the kinds o f studies that situationists take to be representative o f established
trends in research, we have good reason to be skeptical that the body o f data upon
which situationism relies raises any real concerns for character and virtue.
Indeed, even though there is good reason (a) to be cautious about making
claims about character and virtue based upon the experimental results o f current
studies in social psychology and (b) good reason to think that these research programs
and the propositions regarding character which they motivate ought to be assessed on
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an individual basis, it would seem that most o f the experiments popularly cited by
situationists suffer from a single overarching weakness. This weakness is that they
rely almost exclusively upon the classification o f the observed behaviour o f
participants as a whole, and typically ignore a wealth o f other potentially
explanatorily powerful information from the individuals themselves. As noted by
Kamtekar, such a singular focus produces an exclusionary effect wherein, “the
character trait will [be taken to] determine behaviour in isolation from other character
traits, thoughts, concerns, and so forth a person might have in a given situation”
(2003, p. 474).
But this approach to research is wrong headed since it proposes that, “people
who possess a given trait are expected, to the extent that they possess the trait, to
behave spontaneously and unreflectively in ways that manifest it on every occasion”
(Kamtekar, 2003, p.474). What is important to this last quote is not, as was earlier
noted, the situationists’ unreasonable expectation for a perfect behavioural record, but
rather, that they also expect that the behaviours in question be accomplished without
reference to the thinking individual. However, people are not simple automata: they
each enter a situation with a particular set o f background beliefs, attitudes, values, and
assumptions. And these factors shape in part how a person construes and evaluates a
given situation, as well as how they may behave within it. So for an experiment to
reveal that a majority o f participants may behave in a certain way for a particular
situation says nothing about the internal cognitive processes o f the individuals who
produced the results. Part o f the problem, as Sreenivasan sees it, is that, “the results of
the [social] psychological research are reported at the level o f the population
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aggregate” (2002, p. 56). They fail to provide specifics about individual participants.
Thus, it could be the case that, what appears to be the result o f a single situational
variable is actually the result o f numerous other factors unique to the varying
experience and thoughts o f the individual participants. And further, such behaviours
may even prove to be consistent with a particular character type when looked at from
the perspective of the individuals themselves, where the individuals actually value the
type o f consistency in question for themselves.
The lacking detail allowed by such oversights in the experimental designs o f
studies often cited by situationists has prompted Kamtekar to suggest that, “rather
than isolating character variables and testing for their manifestations in behaviour,
social psychologists need to engage in more painstaking research that takes into
account how the considerations experimental subjects have in mind might involve
various character traits and how these might interact” (2003, p. 476). That is to say
that, researchers should engage in dialogue with the individual participants with the
aim o f understanding both the cognitive and motivational factors that may be at work
in guiding their behaviours; and further, that such communication should be analyzed
for signs o f character-relevant thought processes. Perhaps more importantly, as
Kamtekar points out, for the most part4 “we should only expect people to behave
consistently with traits which they deem important to have, or in areas in which
consistent behaviour matters to them” (2003, p. 476). Otherwise, it seems that the
situationists are guilty o f operating within the kind o f error that they claim to be

4 This method has its limits as well. In cases like pathological lying, som eone could have the character
trait o f being a liar, yet they may deceive them selves about it and not report reliably about the trait
even though the trait is present.
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trying to remedy— that is, the fundamental attribution error— since the experiments
and interpretations that they employ rely upon the assumption that the participants
should have the character traits in question before the results can confirm (on their
account), that they in fact do not possess these traits. Indeed, it would appear much
more cogent for the presumed characterological dispositions to be avowed by the
participants to begin with, instead o f operating under the assumption that people
generally think they ought to have them, since the later track renders the current
popular studies nothing more than examples o f the fundamental attribution error at
work. As we have already seen in section 2.1, this specific tendency toward error
cannot be taken to count against the existence o f character directly.
For Kamtekar, it is only when, “we have identified the particular traits and
behaviours relevant to particular individuals, [that] we may [meaningfully] test for
consistency correlations between traits and behaviours and among behaviors across
situations” (2003, p. 477). And again, to acquire data for or against these kinds o f
correlations would require a more longitudinal type o f research program; that is, one
that tracks the progress o f the same subjects across multiple trials. If these
considerations were to be taken to heart in new research programs, then we would
obtain much more compelling results, since not only would the tests track particular
individuals to obtain global ratings; but these would be sensitive to the goals, values,
and reasoning strategies o f each unique individual. Furthermore, according to
Kamtekar, “if one’s purpose is to evaluate virtue ethics, then the standard will have to
be different [than the folk psychological one] and to take account o f the fact that we
are thinking, goal-oriented creatures” (2003, p. 485). Indeed, where conceptions o f
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character are operationally defined by psychologists, mere behavioural observations
may satisfy their demands; however, when considering the richer concept o f character
derived from Aristotelian thought, the background knowledge and reasoning o f the
individual remain integral components to making sense o f character.
There is more that is left to be said, however, about the social psychologists’
almost exclusive focus upon behaviour. One area o f warranted concern, as noted by
Sreenivasan, is whether or not the, “behavioural measures [developed by
psychologists] properly operationalize the character trait[s]” in question (2002, p. 57);
for in some cases, the ways that traits are defined may have more to do with
distinctions proper to the profession, than they do with distinctions that are relevant to
virtue or common understandings o f character. Thus, the rule o f thumb should be—
where the research is done with situationist concerns in mind— to stick as closely as
possible to specifications o f character identified by the individual participants
themselves. Moreover, according to Athanassoulis, “empirical evidence about
outward behaviour alone, is not sufficient in order to draw inferences about the
precise state o f character o f the agent” (2000, p.218). This is because, as Aristotle’s
theory o f virtue suggests, agents may act similarly but from different motives and
thoughts.

2.7 The Good Life and the Role of Practical Reason

It is important also to recognize that the virtues Aristotle spoke o f in the
Nicomachean Ethics were an attempt to emphasize a certain manner o f orientation
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towards living that was thought to contribute to the ultimate goal o f attaining a good
life. Thus, as Joel Kupperman sees it, “character can be viewed in terms o f control
mechanisms, which promote reliability in areas o f life in which reliability matters,
and which would appear indispensable to a good life” (2001, p. 250). So the
importance o f behavioural consistency is established by the individual in relation to
their assessment o f its value in regards to living a good life. Therefore, where the
consistency o f behaviour is seen to be o f no great importance to one’s living the good
life, an individual may opt to disregard such demands. This is perfectly consistent
with the aims o f virtue theory; since, as Maria Merritt suggests, “when virtue ethics
does deal with problems o f how to act, it has arrived at them from the starting point of
how one should live, and returns from them to that point” (2000, p. 370). However, to
understand what makes a life a good one involves contemplation and reasoning; that
is, one must come to understand, through deliberation and reflection, that one ought
to value the virtues because, being virtuous contributes to having a good life.
Moreover, Aristotle him self took the virtues to be, “modes o f choice or [to] involve
choice” (Kaplan, 1958, p 188), and thus, to act virtuously involves not only the
decision to value a virtuous way o f life, but to be able to understand (i.e. have
knowledge about) how one’s choices relate to virtue.
Understood in a certain light, these last considerations could seriously
undermine the kinds o f situationist critiques o f virtue that are derived from studies
like the ones on obedience developed by Milgram. For example, suppose that some of
the subjects of the Milgram experiments took themselves to be compassionate, and
believed themselves in possession o f this trait in a fairly robust sense (which is to say
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that they value consistently behaving compassionately). It is hard to imagine that
anyone who would identify themselves to have such a trait would be willing to
participate in a similar study ever again, much less so to grant full compliance if they
were expected to (unless perhaps they also believe themselves to be overwhelmingly
disposed toward obedience). And this is at least in part because they would have a
cognitive frame o f reference to guide their moral reasoning and behaviour for future
instances o f a similar type; and with an adequate opportunity for reflection, such
individuals could reason about their prior moral failings and resolve not to allow them
to happen again. Indeed, if the confederates in such experiments had really been
shocked, it is exceedingly difficult to imagine that upon debriefing, participants who
truly thought themselves compassionate, but failed to disobey in the first instance,
would be inclined to repeat their actions in another set o f trials. And this is another
reason for inspiring confidence in the likelihood that the appropriate types o f
longitudinal studies would find in favour o f behavioural consistency given the
necessary trial repetitions.
However, when the situationist position is fully elaborated, it is revealed that
situationist conclusions are not only a threat to virtue and the notion o f character, but
also to common perceptions regarding the efficacy o f practical reason. Nonetheless,
they remain a threat that, so far, seriously lacks warrant. Kamtekar surmises the point
well:

Perhaps, if situationism is true, then the answer to the practical question “what can I do
to take charge o f my situation?” is “nothing”— the features o f situations that determine
behaviour are so subtle and surprising that no ordinary rational strategies could enable
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us to be masters o f our situations. But such pessimism is premature, and i f it were ever
to becom e warranted, then it is not only virtue ethics and the notion o f character that
w e would have to jettison, but the power o f practical reasoning. (2003, p. 491)

Indeed, it would appear that the situationists have a much greater task at hand
in dispelling the efficacy o f practical reason than they do in regards to challenging the
adequacy o f personality constructs for determining behaviour. Surely, most would
agree that they have not begun to touch upon the ways in which practical reasoning
may be involved in directing behaviour. Moreover, without allowing room for
reasoned responses to situations, it is difficult to imagine that the average individual
has much to gain from situationist warnings— since it is unlikely that people caught in
the trappings o f the current social reality could avoid things like being subjected to
the demands o f higher-ups (i.e. authority figures: a boss, the police, et cetera), or
finding themselves pulled in different directions by competing moral demands. For
example, one might pass a stranded person on the highway but be conflicted about
whether they should stop to help since they are already running late for a shift
volunteering at a soup kitchen. Indeed, as Kamtekar notes, “as individual agents, we
can’t just rig our situations or wait for our situations to be changed, we often have to
act in and upon the situations we find ourselves in” (2003, p. 489). So the situationist
suggestion to avoid situations within which we have little or no control over our
behaviour— especially such situations as those derived from the experimental
examples they provide— appears to be unrealistic since in many cases, we may truly
be capable of doing no such thing.
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Furthermore, as was noted earlier, it is not always clear exactly what aspects
o f the situation are responsible for influencing behaviour; therefore, Sabini and Silver
suggest that, “the advice the situationist gives— be sensitive to situational features
that may affect your behavior in subtle ways— is [in regards to helping with ethical
reflection,] useless, for the same reason that warnings about heightened terrorism
threats are useless: they are unfocused; they warn people to be suspicious o f
everything... without any hint as to what those [subtle situational] variables are”
(2005, p. 561-562). So not only are people unlikely to be able to avoid certain
situations but, when in those situations, they face the further difficulty o f not
necessarily being able to identify the exact sources o f influence upon their behaviour;
and thus, the prospect for mounting any kind o f adequate strategy o f defense against
these influences appears dismally bleak-—and likewise, the situationist warnings
appear empty (i.e. lacking any real content).

2.8 Some Remarks on Situationist Thought and Characterological Thinking

Though it may be that the views expressed in this chapter raise serious
concerns for the situationist stance, and challenge situationism on multiple fronts, this
does not mean that the situationists are not picking up on something interesting or
important. Indeed, as was noted earlier, situationist research may have implications
for ethical theory—however doubtful be their position for the elimination o f character
based views on virtue— in that it might help to identify subtle cognitive and
motivational barriers to acting in step with what one takes to be their type o f
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character. Nevertheless, the findings which motivate the situationists’ eliminativist
project simply do not warrant views as bold as the ones they are advancing. Rather, it
seems that the situationists have been over eager in extending their conclusions about
the implications o f research for classical views on character and virtue, and have
hastily generated claims far beyond what the limited range o f behavioural data should
allow.
In the next chapter, I intend to broaden the scope o f the debate by venturing
beyond behavioural research and into the more private realm o f what goes on
cognitively when we think about character, the self, and others. This is done in the
hopes o f expanding any reasonable perspective or treatment o f character to include
such mentations. The next section relies heavily upon the mental space mapping
theory known as ‘conceptual blending’, developed by Gilles Fauconnier and Mark
Turner— and it is, in the first place, an exposition o f their theoretical framework, by
way o f some examples that I have developed. After laying the groundwork o f their
system, I will explore what it tells us about how we think in terms o f character and
identity. Before elaborating in any greater detail, however, I will simply opt to
transition into the next chapter o f this thesis. But first, I call to the reader’s attention
that, although it may not be apparent at the outset o f the next chapter just how the
conceptual blending model addresses the problem o f the existence o f character, one
should, by the latter half o f section 3.3, be able to appreciate the kinds o f
contributions that such a model can make in regards to identifying the essential ways
in which we make use o f and understand the notion o f character. Also, in section 3.4,
I will explicitly state my personal views regarding the indispensability o f character
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concepts and the importance o f conceptual blending to revealing just how valuable
and important such concepts are.
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3.0 Integrating Conceptual Integration

Behind the seamless and effortless flow o f experienced mental phenomena lie
some very intricate and complex cognitive processes. The mental space (i.e.
“cohesive packet o f conceptual information” Rohrer, 2005, p. 1690) theory dubbed
conceptual blending (developed by Fauconnier and Turner [F&T]), attempts to
explain some o f these more elaborate and integrative cognitive processes. In this
section, I will outline and explain what F&T consider to be the basic components o f
conceptual blending. I will also explain some o f the core types o f blends and their
differences as well as illustrate what is involved in the process o f performing a
conceptual blend. I will then explore the role o f conceptual blending as it relates to
our conceptions o f self and others in terms o f character and personality. Unless
otherwise identified, all o f the examples used to highlight the ideas o f F&T are my
own, and each o f the examples I have developed for this thesis are thoroughly
compatible with the conceptual blending paradigm o f F&T. Later, in section 3 .4 ,1
will use the insights regarding the ways we think about character and personality
provided by blend theory to challenge the situationist view that the concept o f
character ought to be abandoned.
Indeed, in addition to the rather compelling critiques o f situationism identified
in the last chapter, there remains another way to challenge situationist suggestions by,
in a sense, reshaping the problem o f character. That is to say, perhaps instead o f
asking the question, “does character exist?” as the situationists seem to propose, what
we should be asking, in regards to whether the concept o f character should be
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retained or rejected, is rather: “does the concept o f character prove useful?” I think
most would agree, after an examination o f the ideas and insights regarding how we
think about character provided within this chapter, that the latter question should be
answered with a resounding “yes!” As a result, contrary to the character eliminativist
campaign o f the situationists, I will argue that the notion o f character should be
retained, since it is useful for behavioural predictions or classifications, as well as
having many positive implications for a number o f human practices, relations, and
cognitive processes. But before getting into the reasons why we should not abandon
the concept o f character, we need to develop a deeper appreciation for what goes on
cognitively when we think in terms o f character.

3.1 The Components of Conceptual Blends

Conceptual blending is a mental space mapping theory. A mental space, as
was mentioned at the beginning o f this chapter, denotes a unified conceptual bundle
o f information. According to F&T, such information bundles are, “constructed as we
think and talk, for purposes o f local understanding and action” (2002, p. 40). That is,
they allow us to make sense o f and react to our immediate perceptions and cognitions
The information within these mental spaces is connected with long term memory; it
can be connected both generally, in terms o f ‘schematic frames’ (e.g. eating, talking,
et cetera), and specifically. For example, the first time you tried sushi, or the
conversation you had with Sally about politics several weeks ago. Mental spaces,
according to F&T, contain various incomplete elements and are typically organized
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by general schematic frames. Various diagrams will be used to help clarify what is
involved in conceptual blending in this thesis. Within these diagrams, mental spaces
will be displayed as ellipses or circles; the elements o f mental spaces will either be
listed or displayed as icons within the ellipses or circles; and the connection between
elements will be shown as lines. The lines represent what F&T call ‘cross-space
mappings’ which essentially denote connections between counterparts from various
mental spaces. Shown in figure 3.1 are a mental space, and some possible elements o f
a mental space, both specific elements and general schematic
elements.

General schematic frame
elements

Specific elements

Mental Space

Figure 3.1 Mental Space and Elements

A conceptual blend is composed o f two or more input structures, a generic
space, and a fourth blended space. The input structures are simply mental spaces, and
the generic space is a sort o f schematic frame responsible for the initial partial
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mapping o f input structures. That is to say, the generic space contains those features
or elements that are common among the input structures. Imagine, for example, a
veteran champion figure skater responding, “I think I’m really only competing against
myself out there,” after having been asked by a reporter, following a win at the World
Championships competition, whether or not she was nervous about the strong
performances o f some o f her competitors. The statement made by the figure skater
may certainly evoke a conceptual blend; however, we will first examine how this
statement relates to the blend components described so far. First, there may be two or
more mental spaces evoked by such a statement (for the sake o f simplicity we will
assume only two), perhaps, the skater’s winning performance at the World
Championships on M ay 2nd o f 2005, and her recently earned win at the same
competition on May 4th o f the following year. The generic space, as shown in figure
3.2, would contain the elements ‘figure skater’, ‘World Championships competition’,
an unspecified ‘routine’, and a non-descript ‘day o f competition’, since these
elements are common to both input structures.
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Generic Space
-Figure skater \
.-Routine* ..
-World
N
Championships
Competition
-Dav of event*
■Figure skara
■Routine /
-Competition
■Date
Input Mental Space World Championship:

■Figure skater
■Routine
■Competition
■Date
y
Input Mental Space World Championships
2006

* (unspecified)

Figure 3.2 Input M ental Spaces, Generic Space and Connections

The blend is the result o f partial projections from the input structures into a
fourth space. This fourth space is the blended space. O f this novel, fourth, blended
space, Fauconnier claims, “Through pattern completion and dynamic elaboration, it
develops an emergent organization o f its own” (2001, p. 256). In other words, the
blend becomes a unique conceptual entity that contains greater content than that
provided by either o f the input structures. Take for example, the blend that may be
constructed in the mind o f a spectator who heard the statement made by the figure
skater. For the spectator, the notion o f her ‘competing against h erself may prompt a
blend wherein the figure skater’s performance is evaluated against her performance
from the same competition a year prior— and not only that, the blend allows the
spectator to mentally create an impossible situation wherein the same figure skater
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from a year prior is conceived o f as having literally competed against her more recent
self. In the blend, the respective days o f the competition are m apped onto a single
non-descript day and so become fused; the locations o f the event, if different for both
inputs, are mapped onto a generic ‘arena o f competition’, and are therefore
compressed into a single place; the competition venue, because it is the same event, is
fused, and becomes simply ‘The W orld Championships’; and the figure skater input
elements resists being fused because the blend is made in reference to two separate
performances, and thus, the unique performances and separation between figure
skaters is preserved (even though we are actually only concerned with a single
skater). The emergent structure o f the figure skater competing against herself occurs
within the blended space and is shown in figure 3.3.
Generic Space
-Figure skater \
,-Routine* .
’-World
\
Championships
Competition
-Day o f event*
-Figure skater
■Routine
•Competition
JOate
/

-Figure skate;
•Routine ^
•Competition
•Date
Input MentafSpa.ce World Championships
2005

'-Figure skater 1 s y *
-Figure skater 2 /
eWorld Championship:
Competition
-Dav of e v e n t* /
,

Input Mental Space World Championships
2006

(unspecified)
Blend

Figure 3.3 The Figure Skater Blend
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According to F&T, there are three main processes responsible for the
emergent structure found within blends: composition, completion, and elaboration.
Composition allows the blend to acquire additional structure that is not present in
either o f the separate input spaces. It allows for this additional structure by
establishing relationships between the input structures. For example, in neither o f the
input spaces for the ‘Figure Skater’ blend do we find two performances by the same
figure skater; however, within the blend there are two separate performances by the
same skater (although within the blend the notion o f two skaters competing against
each other is preserved because each version o f the skater is distinguished by her
actual performance, and thus, as already stated, they resist being fused into a single
person). It is the composition o f input structures that generates two distinct
performances consisting o f two different routines at the same event on the same day.
Completion, on the other hand, helps to generate emergent structure by organizing the
blend elements along familiar schematic patterns (i.e. frames). For example,
completion is responsible for importing the general ‘competition’ schema into the
blend, and renders the separate ‘performance’ elements o f the blend meaningful. In
other words, completion, in part, establishes the appropriate relational context
between blend elements that is necessary for the blend to make sense. Moreover, it is
because o f the organization o f elements provided by completion that we are able to
have the blend play itself out: in the blend, the figure skater is competing against
herself. F&T call this the “running o f the blend” and it is what is meant by the term
‘elaboration’. Elaboration is a dynamic imaginative process that produces emergent
structure based upon the configuration o f the blend generated by completion. In
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neither o f the input spaces is the figure skater competing against herself, but when we
run the blend, this is exactly what happens (i.e. it is what we envision).
Fauconnier also claims that, “The blend can be used to provide inferences,
emotional content, rhetorical force, and novel conceptualization” (2001, p. 256).
These various additional abilities afforded by conceptual blending go beyond what
may be achieved by a simple comparison between input structures. In the ‘Figure
Skater’ blend, the skater competing against herself is the ‘novel conceptualization’,
and the blend allows one to infer which performance is superior regardless o f the
judges’ scores for either o f the original events comprised within the input spaces.
Within the blend, the actual judges’ scores for each o f the separate competitions do
not matter because in neither case (i.e. in neither o f the actual events represented by
the input spaces) did the judges’ rankings make reference to two separate
performances by the same individual— if they had, we may expect the scores to have
been different since such an occurrence could have changed the competition
considerably. Therefore, it is not by simply comparing the two input spaces that we
make sense o f the figure skater’s statement. Rather, it is by way o f performing a
conceptual blend that we come to understand the meaning behind her stating that she
was ‘competing against herself (i.e. trying to surpass her previous performance). In
addition to the features o f conceptual blends just mentioned, Fauconnier considers the
blended space to have, “A dynamic, coherent, life o f its own that is integrated and
autonomous in ways that a mere alignment between structures is not” (2001, p. 278).
Moreover, the ability o f conceptual blends to generate novel total conceptions is what
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distinguishes them as dynamic creative processes, and for F&T, such creative ways of
thinking pervade human cognitive functioning.

3.2 Types of Conceptual Blends

There are four main types o f conceptual integration networks referred to by
F&T: simplex, mirror, single-scope, and double-scope. An analysis o f these blends,
by way o f elaborating some o f the practical examples I have developed, will help to
elucidate conceptual blend theory and its structure mapping approach to
understanding human thought. Also, such an analysis will reveal the way in which
conceptual blends provide a comprehensive framework for understanding some
complex cognitive processes— as will be shown later on in this thesis (section 3.3 &
3.4), especially with respect to those processes involved in the ways that we think o f
character and personality.
Because simplex networks are not as involved in our conceptions o f
personality and character as are the more elaborate kinds o f blends, we will begin our
analysis by taking a look at what F&T call a mirror network. W ithin mirror networks,
the inputs, generic space, and blended space all have the same organizing frame. The
organizing frame serves to specify what is central to the activity, event, or subjects
comprised in the blend. Within this type o f network, the inputs are seen as mirroring
each other because they all share the same organizing frame. Although the generic
space and the blended space share the same organizing frame along with the inputs,
there is often a sense in which the blend contains a richer, more developed structure
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than any o f the other constituents o f the blend. For example, take the blend of, ‘the
Kata’, wherein a karate student is performing a series o f physical strikes against a
field o f imaginary opponents. W ithin this blend, the common organizing frame is that
o f a physical fight between people. The inputs are the karate student and several
imaginary attackers. The more elaborate frame presented in the blend is that o f a
karate student fighting off several attackers. The organizing frame provides a
configuration for the elements o f the blend. If the inputs have the same organizing
frame, they must also share a certain configuration that facilitates their connection.
However, while the inputs o f a mirror network share a certain configuration, there
may be important differences between them on a more specific level. In the Kata
example, several inputs meet the role o f ‘combatant’ or ‘fighter’ in terms o f the
organizing frame, and they thus share a certain configuration. However, in a more
specific way, one o f the inputs fits the frame of, ‘the karate student fighting off
several attackers’ and the other inputs more specifically fit the frame, ‘attackers o f the
karate student’.
Mirror networks are capable o f blending a variety o f inputs, so long as the
said inputs have the same organizing frame. At the level of the organizing frame,
there is no discordance found between inputs. However, at a more specific level
below the organizing frame, the incongruence o f the projected input spaces becomes
clear. The karate student and the attackers differ in regards to their actual existence—
the karate student being an actually existing individual, while the various attackers
are fictions. There are two basic ways that blends dissolve incongruence between
inputs according to F&T. The first way is to project only one o f the incongruous
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elements into the blend. For example, in the Kata blend, the karate student and the
attackers fit the frame, ‘fighting people’ and these projected elements are fused within
the blend. However, on a more specific level, there is incongruence between the
inputs with respect to the element o f ‘actual existence’, and only actual existence is
projected into the blend. Another way to resolve the specific level incongruence
between elements is to incorporate them within the blend. For example, in the Kata,
the inputs share the same frame element ‘person’ or ‘fighter’, but there is an
important way in which the inputs resist being fused within the blend. Rather than
being fused into a single unity, as shown in figure 3.4, the more specific elements of
‘attacker’ and ‘karate student’ are both incorporated into the blend to yield, ‘people’
or, ‘fighters’ o f different types.
Generic Space

- A Fight
- People/Fighters

-Imagined attackers

-Real Karate Student

Input Mental
Space

Input Mental
Space
-Karate Student
,
fighting off attackers

Blend

Figure 3.4 Mirror Network: The Kata Blend
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For F&T, mirror networks (as well as other types o f blends), may perform
what they label ‘compressions’ upon various components o f a blend, such as time,
space, identity, role, cause-effect, change, intentionality, and representation (i.e. what
they call, ‘vital relations’). A compression is a sort o f combination o f apparently
remote cognitive elements which results in the object o f the compression being
understood as a distinct unit. Or as Seana Coulson and Todd Oakley describe it, “the
term compression is used to describe an entity in a blended space that has distinct
counterparts in multiple input spaces, and, moreover, those counterparts are related to
one another via a vital relation...the relationship that allows us to draw mappings
between elements in different mental spaces can be “compressed” so that a single
element in a blended space simultaneously represents all o f its counterparts in the
various input spaces in the network” (2005, p. 1533). For example, within the Kata
blend, the vital relation o f ‘space’ is compressed, from an actual space where the Kata
is taking place and an imagined space where attackers are advancing on the student,
to a single space wherein the student is visualizing and reacting as if fighting off
actual attackers.
Mirror networks render compressions especially easy due to the agreement
between organizing frames; but compression remains a central activity to blends in
general, according to Joseph Grady, who claims that, “one o f the most fundamental
principles guiding the creation o f new, figurative conceptualizations is the
‘compression’ o f relations holding across input spaces (i.e. ‘outer space relations’),
into simpler configurations in the blend” (2005, p. 1603). In addition to this process
so typical o f blends in general, one may also decompress the frames or input elements
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to regain a perspective o f the constituent spaces o f the blend. Moreover,
decompression, or ‘disintegration’, is just as important as compression is to the
blending process— since, as Anders Hougaard (2005, p 1653-1685), and Carl Bache
(2005, p. 1615-1635), suggest: before the various combinatorial processes o f blends
become active, the extraction o f various cognitive elements from other conceptual
unities must first occur. Thus, compression and decompression/disintegration appear
to be equally involved in, and equally invaluable component processes o f conceptual
blending in general.
For F&T, there is an important reason why such processes occur—to achieve
what they call ‘human scale’. For F&T, we are, “evolved and culturally supported to
deal with reality at [a] human scale” (2002, p. 322); that is, we have developed to
“have direct perception and action in familiar frames that are easily apprehended by
human beings.. .[which] typically have very few participants, direct intentionality,
and immediate bodily effect and are immediately apprehended as coherent” (2002, p.
312). In short, human scale can be understood as a designator for an instantaneously
clear and uncomplicated grasp o f various elements. Some o f the benefits o f attaining
human scale, according to F&T, include: the acquisition o f global insight, the
reinforcement o f vital relations, the combination o f numerous elements into a single
representative, and the ability to understand narrative cohesiveness (p. 312). As will
be seen in section 3.4, these last points are deeply related and important to how we
think about character.
A further type o f conceptual blend is a single-scope network. What defines a
single-scope network is that the input spaces contain two different organizing frames
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yet only one o f the organizing frames is projected into the blend. The idea o f
completing a puzzle provides a lucid frame for our understanding the work o f a
detective. Indeed, when engaged in working upon a certain case we might say the
detective is putting together the pieces o f a puzzle. To assume this type o f perspective
is to perform a conceptual blend wherein an alignment takes place between the inputs
but only one o f the input frames is projected into the blend, in this case the frame,
‘completing a puzzle’. The input, ‘detective working on a case’ and the, ‘person
solving a puzzle’ input are connected along the lines of, the puzzle solver to the
detective, the assembly and organization o f the puzzle pieces to the assembly and
arrangement o f evidence and clues within the case, and the completion o f the puzzle
to the solving o f the case. In this example, the ‘completing a puzzle’ frame provides
the configuration for the elements o f the blend, and there is only one person focused
upon resolving a problem.
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Figure 3.5 Single Scope Network: Puzzle Solving Detective Blend

Double-scope networks differ from single-scope networks primarily in the
sense that, for double scope networks, the inputs not only commonly have
incongruous frames, but also, two o f the organizing frames provide important
structural elements to the frame o f the blend. However, the frame o f the blend will
have some additional structure o f its own. The incongruity o f the input frames allows
for some imaginative work to be done in the construction o f the blend and may thus
result in some highly creative and novel conceptualizations. A simple example o f a
double-scope blend would be, ‘talking over dinner’. Such a blend involves two
distinct conceptual frames that are partially integrated in an appropriate way to make
sense o f the scenario. One o f the input frames is ‘talking’ and the other is ‘eating’.
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These two frames are structurally incongruous, and they designate normally non
overlapping functional roles. However, as shown in figure 3.6, within the blend we
can imagine individuals engaged in a discussion throughout a meal, thanks in part to
the characteristics provided by each o f the frame inputs, along with the additional
provisions o f etiquette as emergent structures o f the blended frame. If the dinner
discussion took place while watching television, it is perhaps not too difficult to
imagine how this combined set o f activities could be used as a prom pt for the
formulation o f a multiple blend. Multiple blends may contain several different frames
and generic spaces, some o f which may even be partial blends themselves.

Generic Space
M\vo people i n \
close proximity

-Two people talking

-Two people
having dinner

Input Mental
Space

Input Mental
Space
-Two people /
tailing over
dinner
-Etiquette
y

Blend

Figure 3,6 Double Scope Network: Talking over Dinner
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The examples I have used to illustrate the three main types o f conceptual
blends mentioned above should provide a general idea o f how multiple blends may
work. For this reason, and because a deep understanding o f multiple blends is not
crucial to the aim o f this thesis, I would like to shift the focus towards the
implications o f conceptual blending theory as it relates to character and identity in the
following section.

3.3 Characters and Blends

There are many examples to be found in popular literature and film that
provide a global image o f a given character’s predictable dispositions and behaviours
within various situations. Most any lead role in a modem film will serve as an
example that provides viewers with a general conceptual construct o f that character’s
typical forms o f behaviour. When one o f these characters is faced with a novel
situation, we may be left thinking that their behaviour was so typical o f them.
Moreover, such characterological conceptual entities have the ability to remain
recognizable regardless o f the organizing frame they are a part of. In other words, we
can imagine how a certain character may react in a given context regardless o f
whether or not we have ever witnessed their behaviour in such a situation. Restated,
just as an organizing frame may remain intact regardless o f the characters that it
encompasses, character identity may remain conceptually intact regardless o f the
frame that organizes it.
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In many blends, it is important that a complete conception o f a certain
character be imported into the blend. For example, a detective m ay imagine that she is
an infamous serial killer such as Jeffrey Dahmer in order to attempt to understand the
mind o f a serial killer with similar characteristics, perhaps a copy-cat killer, that she is
currently engaged in pursuing. The detective does not simply import what is known
about Jeffrey Dahm er’s character but she also projects into the blend what he would
do next if he were responsible for the crimes she is investigating. Indeed, ‘getting into
the m ind,’ understood as assuming the identity o f whomever or whatever one is
pursuing or confronting, is a common practice to many different activities, from
hunting to the game o f chess, that allows for various predictions to be made. The
mere fact that appeals to character in common parlance are understandable suggests a
general acceptance o f the existence o f such an underlying character. Indeed, F&T
claim, “Characters, like frames, are basic cognitive cultural instruments. We may
dispute every aspect o f their accuracy or legitimacy or invariance, or even their very
existence, but cognitively we cannot do without them” (2002, p.250). In other words,
characterological conceptualizations are indispensable features o f human cognitive
processes; and they are deeply relevant to a myriad o f different ways in which we
construct and perceive meaning. More will be said about what this means for
situationism later on (in section 3.4).
Inherent to the development o f the three core types o f conceptual blends
addressed in this paper is a focus upon the organizing frames. Indeed, the three main
types o f blends were essentially defined in terms o f frame relations across inputs, the
generic space, and the blended space. However, for F&T, character and identity are
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just as important as frames are to our ways o f thinking. For example, take a teenager
who was humiliated by a prank in front o f his peers. In conveying the story to an
older sister who was not present at the time o f the occurrence, the older sister may
react by responding, “If I were you, I ’d get them all back double.” In this blend, we
have the organizing frame of, ‘repaying a prank’ along with a blended concept o f the
person who is to repay the prank. In the blend, the person has the identity o f the
teenage boy and his characteristic anger for having been humiliated, but also has the
vengeful disposition o f the older sister. In this last example, the blend has a single
organizing frame; however, as stated earlier, character may remain intact even when
transported into different frames. For example, the statement, “W ould you trust him
to pack your parachute?” may serve to highlight an individual’s character in a novel
frame. In this scenario it is irrelevant that neither the person addressed, nor the person
referred to, have ever gone parachuting. What is important is that casting this
particular character into this blended frame provides a compression o f external
features that allows for a global perspective o f the character’s reliability and
trustworthiness that is not dependent upon the organizational frame that the character
is placed within. This example serves to show how conceptual blending plays a key
role in the development o f notions o f the cross situational stability o f character, since
it provides the means for a global conception o f an individual’s character that is
unmarred by the specifics o f context.
One o f the ways that conceptual blending contributes to the development o f a
coherent construct for an individual character is by producing a generic space for that
individual. By observing a character’s reactions within different settings, we are able
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to obtain a unified view o f that character’s standard behaviour. Notice that this kind
of aggregation o f behavioural observations from diverse situations is precisely what
was recognized in the second chapter (section 2.1) o f this thesis to be important to
making more confident and warranted ascriptions o f character. Here, this unified
view o f a character is manifested within the generic space delegated to the character.
It is also possible, according to F&T, to create a generic space for a type o f person;
for example, the liar, the proud, or the credulous individual. Such a generic space is
built up from regularities across the behaviours o f people who fit the classification.
Moreover, it would appear that, when people commit the fundamental attribution
error, what is happening is that those committing the error are conceptualizing
another in terms o f such generic classifications, and that this is occurring with
insufficient observational cues to warrant such attributions. Thus, a reasonable
response to such a problem is not to abandon the notion o f character as the situationist
would suggest, but rather, to emphasize that the degree o f confidence which can be
accorded to a character attribution is directly proportional to the amount and
distribution o f previous behavioural observations made o f the individual in question.
From an analysis o f some o f the ways that blends relate to conceptions of
character, F&T have derived a set o f three principles, “To clarify a single frame, fill it
with different essential characters; to clarify the relationship between frames, fill
them with the same essential character; and to clarify essential character, transport it
across different frames.” (2002, p. 252). These principles serve to show how different
blends can be used to emphasize central features o f either organizing frames or
character. However, there is a further aspect o f conceptual blending that allows
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blends between characters or the blending o f a character w ith a frame. In the,
‘Detective D ahm er’ example mentioned earlier, the character spaces for both the
detective and Jeffrey Dahmer are fused into a single conceptual entity. Such a blend
may be prompted by the detective asking herself, “If I were Dahmer, what would I do
next?” The detective’s projection into the blend o f Dahmer’s character, derived from
a deep knowledge o f his history, need not be perfectly accurate. Rather, what is
important to the blend is that it grants the detective certain relevant and valuable
insights into her current problem. Performing such a character blend has the
remarkable ability to actually generate novel and useful ideas, or render apparent
various ways o f approaching a certain problem not available to the subject outside o f
the blend. This blend is a mirror network, if understood in terms o f the organizing
frame. However, if understood in terms o f the characters, it is a double-scope blend,
due to the radically different character components associated in the blend. Blends o f
the, ‘If I were y o u ,...’ sort, such as the one provided in the, ‘Embarrassed Teenager’
example, provide a common and obvious portrayal o f integration between characters.
There is a further sense in which conceptual blends may provide insight into
one’s own typical dispositions. Such blends can act as a means o f redemption,
achieving vengeance, and redeeming honor. For example, imagine a mother hearing
that her adult son is being pushed around by a boss at work and replying,

“Do you remember when you were in primary school and the bullies pushed you
around? Do you remember submitting to their commands? That’s exactly what you
are allowing to happen with your boss. You’ve recounted all the ways that he has
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taken advantage o f your unquestioning obedience, but you’ve failed to realize that he
is bullying you. Once again, you are cowering to a bully.”

In this blend, the input, ‘cowering to bullies’ is imported from the character’s
childhood and it provides the organizing frame for the blend. The, ‘cowering to
bullies’ frame provides the configuration for the relationship between the character
and his boss. However, there remains a deeper more subtle psychological richness
and unity to the character within the blend. In fact, this psychological unity is part o f
the point o f the m other’s statements. Furthermore, the m other’s comments are
directed at the adult son who is being bullied, and thus, he is required to perform a
double-scope blend that integrates his identity from two different time periods. The
adult being pushed around by a boss is blended to the child being pushed around by
schoolyard bullies. The blend is a way o f getting at a characterological behavioural
disposition that is only evidenced within actual situations. Cowering to a boss and
cowering to bullies are clear examples o f manifested behaviour. Such blends, for
F&T, provide us with a general psychological principle, “Outer-space vital relations,
often connecting a person in one space to himself in another, can be compressed into
inner-space character traits understood to be part o f the essence o f the person” (2002,
p. 259). In other words, one’s typical behaviours across situations are conceptually
unified as a core aspect o f the individual’s character.
The way that such a blend provides an opportunity for redemption is by
drawing a parallel between situations and treating them as equivalent. Understood in
terms of the organizing frame, the ‘Bully Boss’ example just recounted is a mirror
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network. The ‘son’ character in this blend is presented with an opportunity to stand
up for him self within the new workplace situation. Success in the new workplace
situation has the effect of shaping the character to have overcome his former
cowardice; that is to say, it allows the individual to conceive o f him self as having
undergone noticeable character development (development that situationism would
likely misapprehend as merely behavioural inconsistency). In terms o f the original
inputs, no changes have taken place. However, within the blend, the two situations
are fused, and because the core character projection is derived from the adult son, his
successful negotiation o f the workplace scenario redeems his character from the
earlier cowardice. From the perspective o f his new success in standing up to his boss
at the workplace, motivated by the blend, his earlier cowardice seems merely an
interruption to the newly formed character trait o f courage. It m ay appear awkward
that the success in one setting should redeem the failure to take positive action in
another. The input spaces remain objectively unchanged; however, his new successful
action restores his integrity and allows him to conceive him self as having overcome
his childhood inadequacies. Indeed, F&T claim, “No one is deluded: The old failure
stands as unchangeable history. But in the integration network, the psychological
context and weight o f that failure are completely changed” (2002, p. 260). Moreover,
it seems that this is precisely the kind o f reevaluative mental process one might
expect to see involved in the gradual progression o f the average individual towards a
more firmly fixed virtuous disposition— in this case, as concerns the trait o f
courage— as has been described by virtue theory proponents. Note well: the Bully
Boss example is not so much about predictive success as it is about self
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transformation grounded in a character based interpretation o f past events. Moreover,
even if longitudinal studies called into question the existence o f global character
traits, local character traits used in blends would be sufficient for the type o f
redemption and transformation considered in this example.
Fauconnier and Turner argue that, although we can construe a blend in terms
of either the frames or the characters, there is no perfect formula as to how to
assemble these components for any particular blend. For them, though language may
provide some terms for the neat compartmentalization o f concepts, there is no sense
in which characters and frames are ever completely dissociated. In other words,
character identities are always somewhat related to certain frames, and frames are
always somewhat connected to certain types o f characters. For example, the Dahmer
character o f the earlier blend is not someone easily dissociated from the, ‘murder’
frame. There is a sense in which the blend transforms him partially into a detective;
however, he could never be fully divorced from the ‘murder’ frame. Similarly, the
‘murder’ frame is connected to various individuals who have committed such acts.
Indeed, F&T suggest that, ‘‘There is no limit to the amount o f detail in frames or
identities, and at the neurocognitive level o f activations, frames and characters are
always intertwined” (2002, p.262). In other words, the spaces that compose the blend
are structurally diffuse and they intermingle.
Conceptual blends are not restricted to character manipulations o f only living
or present people. Indeed, there are many possible material anchors that may evoke a
sense o f communion with lost ones and the departed, such as, pictures, letters, and
gravesites. These and other items may prompt an individual to create a blend wherein
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a missing or dead person is conceived o f as being fully present and alive, and
intentionally interacting w ith the individual. One may create a blend when visiting a
tombstone that invokes the advice or encouragement o f a deceased grandparent, or
allows the individual to relay an expression o f sadness for their absence. According to
F&T, there is nothing spooky about such a mentation. When an appreciation o f the
psychological aspects o f such mental acts is achieved, it becomes clear that the absent
character is imported into the blend from long-term memory and connected to a
current situation. F&T consider these, ‘nonpeople’ (i.e. absent or deceased people), to
be capable o f occupying a blend with equal richness and complexity to familiar
characters that are still breathing.
As one may gather from the examples provided w ithin this section, conceptual
blending is a process that is deeply involved in our thinking about ourselves and
others. In the next section, I will use the insights gathered from what conceptual blend
theory has to say about the way we understand character to challenge the eliminativist
situationist position, a position I will also refer to as strong-situationism.

3.4 Situationism in Light of Conceptual Blending

According to Harman, we should abandon the notion o f character; doubtless,
his Business Ethics Quarterly journal entry entitled, “No Character or Personality”, is
a telling enough sign in regards to the reasons why he thinks we ought to do so. But,
beyond the inadequate support he has provided for his position lies an even more
suspicious set o f speculative claims. Indeed, he has gone so far as to suggest that our
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conceptions o f character are responsible for, “disastrous effects on people’s
understanding o f each other, on [our] understandings o f what social programs are
reasonable to support, and [on our] understandings o f international affairs.” (2000b,
p. 224). Interestingly, he does not hold him self to a similar standard o f empirical
support for these claims as he demands for character based notions, even though they
appear to be far more incendiary and controversial. Moreover, he does not do much
by way o f elaborating as to just how, or in what sense, possessing a concept o f
character is responsible for these supposed calamities. Rather, it seems his argument
is more centrally concerned with the errors we incur when we make character
attributions with insufficient warrant.
With regards to his aforementioned belief (section 1.5) that characterological
thinking has negative consequences for political deliberations, the problem is not that
we think in terms o f character, but simply, that we often make faulty or irrelevant
character attributions. Since, for example, the ‘French Bill Clinton’ blend o f Coulson
and Oakley (2005, p. 1514), shows the former President’s political loss o f grace (in
regards to the Lewinski affair), to be due to cultural taboo’s more than an inability to
lead (i.e. his having an incompetent type o f character). But to say that we make hasty
or faulty character judgments is not to say that the underlying conceptual basis o f our
judgments is ultimately false. Indeed, the ‘French Bill Clinton’ blend (prompted by
the statement: “In France, the Lewinsky affair wouldn’t have hurt Clinton” (2005, p.
1514)) can be seen as a positive example o f how to isolate the kinds o f irrelevant
cultural biases from our thoughts on character that confound rational assessments o f
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an individual’s ability. And so, even within the political sphere, character conceptions
can be useful.
That is not to say that Harman is completely off track, and that all kinds of
thoughts on character are beneficial to political reasoning— as was noted at the outset
o f this thesis they most certainly are not—-but neither do all characterological
ideations regarding political matters end in negative results. Thus, the more
reasonable course o f action appears to be not to abandon the concept o f character, but
instead, to work towards developing measures for guarding against hasty, faulty, and
irrelevant attributions o f character. Indeed, rather than the question o f whether or not
character exists, it is these specific error laden tendencies regarding the attribution o f
character that appear to be most central to the concerns raised by Harman. And more
broadly, it is these tendencies that are o f concern to the warranted attribution o f
character in general.
My primary objection to Harman’s views (and to any situationally motivated
view for character eliminativism, including Doris’ slightly less brash approach), is the
idea that we ought to abandon all talk and thought o f character— what I call the
strong-situationist stance— and the notion that any such talk or thought holds only
negative consequences for human interactions and decision making. Indeed, I think,
along with F&T, that our understanding o f character is a rich and deep process— one
that is partially responsible for many positive outcomes and is essential to how we
make sense o f both ourselves and others; and further, that it is an indispensable aspect
of how we think.
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Contrary to H arm an’s ominous warning that character based thoughts have
“disastrous” effects upon how we think about each other, it seems that it is the
concept o f character that, in part, allows us to develop an understanding o f ourselves
and others, and to envision individual people as having coherent personal identities.
O f course, we may make faulty predictions about an individual’s trustworthiness or
reliability (or some other character trait), in certain circumstances, due to the fact that
we were either too quick to attribute a certain virtuous character type to the
individual, or because we failed to notice the kinds o f pressures involved in the
situational context which the individual faced, or even because certain
characterological conceptions may ultimately fail as predictive tools for behaviour.
Nevertheless, characterological thinking remains an indispensable tool for making
sense o f individual people, as well as their goals and values, and the actions relevant
to them. It remains indispensable even if our understanding o f character only makes
sense retrospectively and not projectively; and this is so because character types, like
people in general, change and grow, and develop and disintegrate over the course o f a
lifespan; therefore, we should never approach the task o f making character based
predictions without some reservations. But in order to extract some kind o f personal
meaning from an individual’s existence, there needs to be some w ay o f unifying the
elements o f their life into a coherent structure— one not unlike what may be
achievable through the process o f compression to human scale found in conceptual
integration networks (i.e. conceptual blends). Indeed, although the insights afforded
by such compressions may appear to be o f value only retrospectively, they do provide
a global image o f character. As such, they are likely (and reasonably so) to confer
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increased predictive confidence in regards to a given individual’s behaviour, even if
such predictions remain an imperfect empirical endeavour.
Consider the Detective Dahmer blend example provided earlier. Within the
blend, the detective draws upon a wealth o f character data in order to gain some fresh
insight as to what some o f the potential next moves o f the suspect might be. It is
unclear that any appreciation o f the situational context prior to the murder could
provide fruitful leads as to the murderer’s next move (barring o f course ordinary
forensic details), since, presumably, many people have been in similar or identical
situations and have not murdered anyone. Indeed, in this scenario, we are not dealing
with an isolated behaviour evoked by a specific situational factor. Rather, it seems
quite clear, both intuitively, and based upon past case details, that a serial killer is in
some way disposed to continue killing regardless o f the subtle specifics o f the pre
murder situation. Thus, the Detective Dahmer blend (i.e. an example o f
characterological thinking), appears to be a useful and beneficial w ay o f
conceptualizing events, one that may provide some very original and rewarding leads,
and assist in the capture o f a serial killer. Others have also commented upon the
practical value o f character blends; for example, Coulson and Oakley claim that,
“even though cognitive models in blended spaces are occasionally bizarre, the
inferences generated inside them are often useful and lead to productive changes in
the conceptualizer’s knowledge base and inferencing capacity” (2005, p. 1515).
Indeed, as in the Detective Dahmer example just mentioned, this kind o f character
blend allows for greater insight into the mind o f a serial killer, and it also allows for
some creative inferences to be drawn regarding some o f the potential next moves of
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the suspect. Moreover, many o f these blend generated inferences m ay not be available
from outside o f the blended mental space. Thus, we have good reason to retain the
notion o f character, regardless o f how some situationists might construe the results
from various social psychological studies. In the examples considered, the research
employed for situationist ends does not address the issue at hand (i.e. how best to
proceed), and thinking in terms o f character in such cases can prove to be exceedingly
valuable.
Consider next, the Embarrassed Teenager blend example mentioned earlier.
For this blend, the situational specifics are not central to the vengeful sister’s thoughts
on behalf o f her brother (other than the obvious fact that a prank was executed at his
expense), nor does it seem likely that explaining the event in terms o f situational
factors would reduce the sympathetic thoughts and feelings o f the sister to null.
Furthermore, there is no mention o f any specific behaviour on the part o f the
embarrassed teenage brother that requires a situation based explanation. And even if
one wanted to construe his embarrassment as a type o f behaviour, in some tortured
attempt to bring situational concerns back into the picture, it would be o f negligible
value, since his embarrassment is only a trivial and subsidiary component o f the
conceptual blend (i.e. what is going on cognitively). The sister’s claim that, “If I were
you I ’d get them all back double!”, betrays an aspect o f her character, and possibly
something about the kind o f personality her brother has as well. Perhaps the statement
was motivated by, and the blend partially composed of, the sister’s knowledge o f her
brother’s typically passive disposition; thus, the statement could be meant as a
rallying cry to motivate her brother to do something about what had happened to him.
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Otherwise, the assertion may have been about what is typically more defining o f her
own character or personality—namely, to seek vengeance. Regardless o f what may be
the underlying motivation for the blend, it involves both character spaces as inputs.
So by bringing to mind such types o f character thoughts, one is also evoking some
rather detailed background information about the individuals involved, for example,
as concerns their typical behavioural, attitudinal, and interpretational characteristics.
These kinds o f blends play a vital role in supporting and promoting social
cohesion as well as providing an outlet for deeper insight into the self. Indeed, as
evidenced by the Embarrassed Teenager example, blends o f the “If I were yo u ...”
type seem inevitably to involve an appreciation o f either the character o f the one for
whom the blend is invoked, or o f the person invoking the blend (i.e. one’s self). Such
character dependent cognitions (i.e. character blends), appear vitally important to
establishing bonds o f empathy, sympathy, and understanding between individuals,
since they are essentially a way o f getting at what it is like to ‘walk a mile in someone
else’s shoes’ (i.e. assume the perspective o f another). This m ay be done both in terms
o f developing a sort o f cognitive appreciation o f the circumstances another finds
themselves within, as well as getting a sense o f what may be their emotional status in
response to the said circumstances. Thus, contrary to Harman’s suggestion that
character conceptions ought to be abandoned due to their widespread negative
consequences; it seems that here, rather, we have reason to be quite optimistic about
thinking in terms o f character, since the kind o f blends just mentioned show how
beneficial such ways o f thinking can be. Indeed, such examples seem to support the
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idea that characterological conceptualizations are indispensable features o f our
thought as well as deeply implicated in many positive aspects o f social cohesion.
One may imagine many other positive examples wherein character forms an
important aspect o f our thought— thoughts which may lead to beneficial and useful
consequences. Indeed, the other examples o f blends I’ve developed in the earlier
sections o f this chapter could serve just such an end. For example, within the ‘Bully
Boss’ blend explained earlier, the son (victim/employee) was provided with a
remarkable means o f achieving a sense o f accomplishment— a sense o f having
overcome former inadequacies in the establishment o f a newfound positive personal
quality. Both in terms o f social appraisal and as pertains to the individual himself,
such an achievement is seen as a kind o f redemption. But the notion o f redemption
only makes sense in reference to some sort o f continuous unity— a unity that, in this
case, was achieved by way o f an appreciation for the characteristic reactions to
certain kinds o f events (i.e. those wherein the son was ‘pushed around’ by others),
that the individual seemed to find him self faced with time and again; and it is only by
way o f internalizing these common experiences and reactions as a part o f his
character that the individual is capable o f understanding both his m other’s concern
and the effect that standing up for him self would have upon his confidence, self
esteem, and self-image (i.e. the kind o f character he takes him self to have).
It is crucially important, in this last example, for the son to be able to
understand him self as a coherent whole; that is, as having an identity (or character)
that persists through time. Otherwise, his pattern o f past reactions may be
unrecognized by him, and if he reacts differently in one instance it may have no real
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bearing on his understanding o f himself. In other words, for him to change his
behaviour from passive to self-assertive would be just that— a change in his
behaviour— and it would bear no relevance to his growth or progress as an individual.
This change would be as a mere blip on the screen, indistinguishable from any other
but simply different. And although the situationist project may be primarily a
descriptive one, it is unclear that any benefit would come from the prescriptions that
situationism could make in regards to his predicament. Should he take Harman’s
advice and, “head the situationist slogan, ‘People! Places! Things!’” (2003, p. 90)?
Such advice merely amounts to the suggestion to stay away from bullies and to stay
away from one’s boss. Surely, this would be no great comfort since bullies are not
always easy to avoid, even less so when one works for them. Are things therefore
hopeless for the son, since the situational forcefulness o f being in the presence o f
bullies seems to have always rendered him a coward? It seems to me that all hope is
not lost, and rather, the son may develop the appropriate behavioural tools for
handling confrontations, or merely identify his own shortcomings and make a firm
decision not to cower to bullies any longer. But as was already stated, such a selfidentification requires that one understand oneself as a coherent unity. So again it
appears, contrary to Harman’s speculations, that thinking in terms o f character can
have a positive role to play for the individual; and more than that, in this last example,
it appears to be o f much greater use and value than any situationist take on things (by
providing normative guidance). In this case, the situationist warnings appear not only
out o f place, but utterly useless.
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Character blends involving ‘nonpeople’, a type that was mentioned earlier,
provide another example o f how thinking in terms o f character can end in positive
results. For example, similar to Athanassoulis’ (2000) notion o f the ideal virtuous
person, an individual facing a moral dilemma may invoke the advice o f a lost loved
one whom they took to be a moral exemplar through a blend in order to help them
resolve the difficulty. Evoking character blends o f deceased loved ones may also help
to provide comfort and relief throughout the grieving process by providing, in a
sense, another opportunity at saying a final farewell, or simply by providing a sense
o f continued closeness preserved by the memory o f the person and their typical
dispositions. It is not at all clear that situationism can provide such emotionally
important kinds o f relief. Indeed, it appears that here, as in the last example,
situationist concerns are entirely out o f place, while character styled thought
processes remain positively meaningful and importantly involved in helping
individuals to navigate through the trials and tribulations o f life in general.
No doubt, there remain a multitude o f examples that could be developed
wherein character thoughts are shown to be o f great importance, to be highly valued,
and to be also very useful to people generally. However, I think that the examples
provided so far are sufficient to both encourage further exploration o f such potential
examples, and more importantly, they are sufficient enough to raise serious doubts
about both the reach o f application o f the social psychological data, as well as the
soundness o f the situationist suggestion to abandon the notion o f character. Therefore,
I will end my development o f such examples here. However, there remain some
suggestions I would like to make to those who endorse a strong-situationist stance:
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primarily, it seems that the character eliminativist situationist ought to look more
closely at just what exactly is involved in our conceptions o f character before making
blanket statements to the effect that they should be abandoned. Indeed, the insights
provided by conceptual blending theory seem to allow a far more comprehensive
understanding in regards to the ways we think about character and employ character
terms, than the mere behavioural data gathered by the social psychological
experiments referenced by situationists— data that ultimately is o f limited relevance
to the ways in which we employ the concept o f character.
Moreover, what seems to be commonly overlooked by situationists, when it
comes to character, is both that it is a process o f development— one that, to study
honestly, would require a comprehensive assessment o f many behaviours over a long
period o f time; and further, that it is, in many important ways, thoroughly entrenched
in our modes o f thinking about ourselves and others. Furthermore, many o f these
types o f character thoughts do lead to positive and useful results; that is, they are not,
as Harman seems to think, all predicated on error. Perhaps, instead o f
characterological thinking being the result o f a certain confirmation bias (as Harman
suggests), it is the strong-situationist position that is guilty o f resulting from such a
bias, since obvious examples o f the value and usefulness o f character thoughts can be
found in the daily lives o f almost anyone; and more importantly, there does exist
empirical data to support the idea that certain aspects o f character are in fact quite
consistent (e.g. Bern’s [1983] template matching research).
The next section o f this thesis is an attempt to address the sense in which
character might be said to be real or to exist. By drawing on ideas from Daniel
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Dennett, it will be shown that while character may not have the kind o f possessed by
a physical object, the ascription o f character is grounded in reality. Character can be
defined in many different ways. The message to be drawn from the next section is
that character conceptions should be understood as useful, empirically grounded
interpretations o f behaviour, and that to argue that one kind o f conceptualization o f
character is problematic (i.e. not supported by the evidence), is by no means to argue
that they must therefore all suffer from the same weaknesses.
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4.0 The Construct of Character: A Direction for Future W ork

Daniel Dennett, in his “The Self as a Center o f Narrative Gravity,” draws the
analogy that a ‘s e lf is a lot like the concept o f the centre o f gravity o f an object
within Newtonian physics. Just as a centre o f gravity is not identical with any
particular atom o f an object, neither is a self identical with any particular neuron (or
packet o f neurons), in the brain. Rather, they are both concepts that can prove to be
quite useful in their respective domains o f interest and application. It appears to me,
that understanding character in a similar light would prove informative and helpful
with respect to addressing an underlying issue within the debate over personality and
character— mainly, as concerns how character is defined in particular cases and
studies, and the adequacy o f such definitions to capture the multifarious ways in
which the concept o f character is understood and employed generally. However, in
order to appreciate what implications Dennett’s ideas may have for character, one
must first understand his analogical reasoning.
According to Dennett, a centre o f gravity, “has a nicely defined, well
delineated and well behaved role within physics” (1992, p. 103). And although a self
may be far more complex than a centre o f gravity, both concepts are commonly
known and deeply involved in how we live our day-to-day lives. W ith respect to our
everyday recognition and dealings with the centres o f gravity o f various objects, for
example, we place dinner plates near the middle o f tables rather than leave them
hanging off o f their edges because we know that if the centre o f gravity o f the plate is
not fully supported by the table then the plate will fall over and we will have a mess
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to clean. We make book shelves level in order to properly support books and keep
them from sliding off based upon our understanding o f their centres o f gravity, and
we stay upright while riding a bicycle by keeping our centre o f gravity adjusted to the
appropriate position over the middle o f the seat. We can manipulate an object’s centre
o f gravity as well as our own, for example, by holding a weighted pole as a tightrope
walker does— which has the effect o f lowering one’s centre o f gravity to make one’s
balance more sure footed. But when we change the centre o f gravity o f an object, the
centre o f gravity itself does not traverse all o f the intermediate positions between its
initial position and its modified one. Rather, because it is an abstraction and not a
tangible physical entity, it only represents one exact location at any point in time, and
its shifting from one position to another is not restricted by ordinary physical means,
for example, as a falling air borne rock’s movement would be restricted by landing in
a tar pit. Indeed, the only properties that a centre o f gravity shares with other objects
in the physical world is that it has a “spatio-temporal location”, but as was mentioned,
it can never be identical to the material object that shares it’s location, for to think so
would be, as Dennett points out, to make a category mistake. To say that the centre of
gravity is not identical to the physical object is not to say that it is not empirically
grounded, for it figures in predictions and explanations. The concept o f the centre o f
gravity o f an object is a widely employed, robust, and deeply useful— not unlike the
notion o f the self, as Dennett understands it.
For Dennett, while a self is real, it does not possess the same type o f reality as
say, a person’s body (1992, p. 105). And in a manner similar to how a physicist posits
a centre o f gravity to explain and predict the behaviour o f certain objects, so too for
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the psychologist and philosopher is it, “theoretically perspicuous to organize the
interpretation” around the central idea o f the self o f a human being (1992, p. 105). It
is this kind o f unified focal point regarding a person that bears a resemblance to how
we understand the individual in terms o f character types. Moreover, it would seem, as
Dennett asserts regarding centres o f gravity and selves, that conceptions o f character,
“have only the properties that the theory that constitutes them endowed them with”
(1992, p. 106). That is to say that, for example, within a given theory or study o f
character or personality, there exists a specific set o f operational definitions— and
these should act to constrain how theorists (including situationists) extrapolate from
the data in order to make more broad generalizations concerning character. In other
words, one’s freedom to make inferences about character in general should be deeply
modeled on and shaped by the limits and allowances o f the theory one is drawing
from. Athanassoulis (2000) seems to have picked up on this line o f thought by
assessing the actual aims and ambitions o f several o f the studies often cited by
situationists, and by arguing that their experimental designs typically do not warrant
the kinds o f extrapolations and generalizations commonly made by situationists. So
what philosophers and other researchers need to keep in mind is that character and
personality may be operationally defined in a number o f different ways, and that not
all operational definitions provide the same license to generalize, or warrant, for
situationist conclusions.
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4.1 Experimental Constructs and Common Understandings

Operational definitions o f character need to be checked against common
understandings o f character, since incompatibility at this level may seriously restrict
the application o f findings to a more general class. For example, according to Bern, “a
sample of individuals is [deemed] inconsistent to the degree that their behaviors do
not sort into the equivalence class that the investigator necessarily imposes when he
or she selects the behaviors and situations to sample” (1982, p. 213-214). The
selected behaviours and situations to be studied play an important role in shaping how
character or personality is understood and defined within the experimental context.
But all too often, these selections, and the experimental designs that encompass them,
result in a sort o f bottleneck effect wherein the operational understanding o f what it
takes to have a consistent character is seriously restricted, and fails to incorporate the
multiple bits o f information that typically go into common character descriptions—
that is, where the individuals providing the descriptions o f others know them
sufficiently well. Moreover, it seems that within most o f the studies cited by
situationists, only group dimensions seem to be given any regard. These and other
reasons have led Bern to suggest that, “consistency and inconsistency are not intrinsic
properties o f behavior, but are judgments by an observer about the match between the
behaviors and his or her category system.” (1982, p. 214). And these categories, for
the most part, fail to do justice to the kinds o f individual patterns o f behaviour that are
relevant to robust character types. Whether we recognize cross-situational
consistencies in behaviour will depend on both (a) the patterns o f behaviour in the
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world and (b) the background theory applied to the interpretation o f that behaviour.
Failing empirically to recognize a coherent, relatively stable pattern in an individual’s
actions—particularly those that are relevant to a certain character type— does not
necessarily signal the individual’s lack o f such behavioural regularities. Rather, it
may simply be the case that our general theoretical constmctions are inadequate to the
task o f revealing that idiosyncratic regularities are at work in real world behaviour.
Thus, our research designs and operational definitions o f character should take their
lead from the patterns o f behaviour we might observe someone to display in less
controlled environments. And these research programs should be tailored more
closely to individual assessments as opposed to group scores.
According to Bern, in contrast to the pre-established criteria o f character
typically devised by researchers, it is personal observances within natural contexts,
rather, that guide our normal descriptions o f those we know well. He suggests that
when describing a friend, “we do not evoke some a priori set o f fixed dimensions that
we apply to everyone. [But] rather, we peek at the data first. That is, we first review
the individual’s behavior and then select a small subset o f descriptors that strike us as
pertinent precisely because they seem to conform to the patterning o f the individual’s
behaviour” (1982, p. 214). So normally, we do not evaluate those we know well by
generating a strictly defined trait term and then disqualifying the person from such a
class for having failed to behave accordingly in various circumstances. Rather, we
seek out the regularities that we are aware o f in the individual’s behaviour and only
then do we attempt to relate these findings to a particular type o f character—the one
that fits most effortlessly with the identified regularities.
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Moreover, according to Bern, there are various conceptual ‘prototypes’ o f
character that serve to remedy apparent incongruities in observed behaviour—that is,
once the right prototype has been aligned with the person in the appropriate way.
(Notice the similarity between these prototypes and the generic spaces for types o f
people in blend theory mentioned in section 3.3). For example, after having been
invited backstage at a concert, one may come to find out that the members o f one’s
favorite rock band, while uninhibited and full o f energy during performances, are
actually quite reserved while not on stage. And though this may at first seem bizarre,
once one constructs or identifies the appropriate conceptual prototype to make sense
o f these observations, one’s confusion subsides. Or according to Bern, “When that
prototype occurs to them, then the concept-attainment task has been solved, and their
initial, provisional verdict o f inconsistency evaporates” (1982, p. 215). So it seems
that in general, we first look for patterns and prototypes to explain the behaviours o f
others; we do this before we are willing to admit that a person is unpredictable or
behaviourally inconsistent— and we will only admit that they are inconsistent after
attempts to find a suitable pattern or prototype have failed us. That is not to say that
we should resist concluding that an individual is behaviourally inconsistent— on the
contrary, where encountered, the evidence should be acknowledged— but rather, that
we generally look for patterns before admitting a person’s behaviour to be disordered.
And furthermore, we should keep in mind that in some cases where conclusions o f
inconsistency are made, the result may be due to a theoretical construct’s having
allotted too narrow a range o f pattern recognition. Therefore, in some cases, even
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where we seem to arrive at the result o f inconsistency, there m ay actually be present a
more broad underlying consistency that we have simply yet to notice.
To reiterate the core points o f this section: character, like Dennett’s
understanding o f the self, is an empirically grounded way o f interpreting a being or
entity. And because theorists and researchers employ specific operational definitions
o f character or personality within their work, we would do well to understand just
what these definitions are— and perhaps more importantly, what they seem to leave
out o f the evaluation. Granted, the situationist perspective relies prim arily upon the
notion that character relevant displays o f behaviour must follow the appropriate
eliciting conditions, and such a demand at first glance appears reasonable. However,
what remains unreasonable about the situationist position is that an aggregate o f
single instances o f behaviour (i.e. the results o f separate single experiments with
different participants) is treated as confirming the view that an individual is typically
behaviourally inconsistent. Indeed, upon closer inspection o f the primary
experimental examples employed by situationists (those discussed within this thesis),
we find no reason to accept the situationist suggestion for the elimination o f
character, since they have not taken pains to even attempt to observe any individual’s
character relevant behaviours over time (be they consistent or not), but instead, have
merely evaluated behaviours from a number o f single and separate instances against
far too strict and unforgiving a definition o f character. What is yet to be done, and
what is necessary in order to conclude with confidence that character (at least the
situationist version o f it) either exists empirically or does not, as has been said, is to
study the same individuals over repeated trials. This suggestion is o f primary concern
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to the resolution o f the debate on character, and any future research would do well to
take notice o f its importance to both moral character theory and personality
psychology.

4.2 Summary

In this thesis, I have attempted to cast doubt upon situationism’s character
eliminativist project by both reviewing several powerful challenges to the situationist
position and by contributing a challenge o f my own. The first set o f challenges to
situationism (chapter two) provided several direct critiques o f the situationist project,
while my own contribution (chapter three) shifted the focus o f the debate from the
question o f the existence o f character to an examination o f the usefulness o f the
concept.
In chapter one, I provided a detailed review o f three popularly cited
experiments from social psychology. Situationists take these three experiments to be a
compelling reason to adopt the situationist stance as well as to be representative o f
trends detected in a much larger body o f experimental research. These experiments
were: the Isen and Levin study concerning mood effects on helping behaviour; the
Darley and Batson study regarding time-stress effects on helping behaviour, and the
Milgram study on obedience. Both Doris and Harman took these experiments to
suggest that people are typically inconsistent in their behaviours across situations.
This is a finding that they believe seriously undermines the traditional Aristotelian
notion o f character (as well as many versions o f virtue theory) since it does not agree
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with the idea o f ‘robust’ or ‘global’ character traits. Moreover, they believe that
situationism can better explain certain (disturbing) world events, such as, the
behaviour o f many German (Nazi) doctors during the Second W orld W ar (why they
killed instead o f cured), and other group struggles for superiority. It was also revealed
that in some cases, situationist interpretations can be more explanatorily powerful
than characterological conceptions. For example, with respect to the variants o f the
Milgram experiment— wherein slight changes to the experimental setting or mode o f
interaction between the participant and the experimenter produced striking
differences in the degree o f obedience obtained— the situationist approach appears to
provide a plausible explanation. Character conceptions are more or less at a loss to
explain the behavioural variation.
Nonetheless, in chapter two, it was argued that the situationists had drawn
conclusions about character that extended far beyond what was warranted by the
social psychological data. Indeed, not only did the situationist interpretations appear
to motivate far too ambitious a view o f the elimination o f character, but other
interpretations o f the social psychological data were shown to be available, and many
of these seemed to provide a much more reasonable view in regards to the reach o f
the implications o f the experimental results. These alternative views and critiques of
the situationist position revealed several o f the stance’s inadequacies and erroneous
assumptions. One o f the false assumptions o f the situationist position was that virtue
theory takes the virtuous character type to be very common, when this is, in fact, not
the case. Therefore, even if a majority o f the people studied appeared to be
behaviourally inconsistent across situations, this finding alone would not necessarily
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weigh very heavily against virtue theory, so long as there are some people who
remained relatively consistent. Furthermore, with respect to behavioural consistency,
it was argued that it is unreasonable for situationists to assume that there must be a
perfect record o f conformity between the eliciting conditions deemed appropriate to
certain character types (or traits), and the kinds o f behaviours they are supposed to
evoke. The reason such an argument was raised is that neither virtue theory nor
common understandings o f character adopt such a strict view. Moreover, even though
under the pressure o f the experimental setting some might fail to produce the desired
behaviour, character notions could still be important factors in explaining the more
ordinary daily behaviours o f people.
In chapter two it was also revealed that the conception o f character that the
situationists employed did not adequately capture the richness o f the concept as it is
understood in virtue theory (or commonly for that matter). The situationist view
failed to account for the practical reasoning o f the individual and her subjective
construal or perception o f the situation. Clearly, the type o f research employed by
situationists would need to be much more sophisticated if they wished to address the
more complete image o f character (i.e. one that includes the capacity for reason)
described by Aristotle, and more recently argued for by philosophers like Kamtekar
and Sreenivasan. Also, in chapter two, it was shown that situationist concerns could
be easily absorbed by current character and virtue theories by way o f understanding
the situational pressures as mere motivational impediments for the thinking
individual. Understood in such a light, situationist pressures would no longer pose a
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threat to the global notion o f character; rather, they would simply be treated as
additions to the domain o f known constraints upon character motivated action.
Nonetheless, the research employed by situationists was considered to be
insufficient to warrant claims for the elimination o f the notion o f character. The main
deficiency o f the studies cited by situationists is that they did not track the behaviours
o f participants over long periods o f time but merely studied single instances o f
behaviour. This flaw— that none o f the popularly cited studies were longitudinal—
was shown to be a major concern for situationists, since without such research their
claims about the nonexistence o f character remain, in an important way, unsupported.
Furthermore, it was noted, that even if such research existed (and was supportive o f
situationist views), virtue theorists and character advocates could still argue that the
participants were not well trained in how to be virtuous or how to develop the
appropriate character types or traits. Thus, it was argued that the general descriptive
findings o f social psychological research do not define the upper limit o f human
potential. It could well be the case that proper character training is all that is required
to increase a person’s behavioural consistency rating across situations.
It was also shown (in chapter two) that there is in fact some empirical support
for the notion of character. Both locally in terms o f fairly specific traits, and globally,
as was seen with regards to Bern’s template matching technique. Furthermore, it was
argued that the debate over the existence o f global character traits could be brought
closer to a reasonable resolution if more carefully designed studies were produced,
and further, that if such studies are going to prove more useful than those currently
available, they must adopt a longitudinal methodology. It is only with reference to
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such work that the situationist position could directly challenge the notion o f global
character traits. However, as argued in chapter three, even if the situationists were to
take the necessary pains to acquire the appropriate support for their eliminativist
position with respect to global character traits (assuming the relevant research turns
out to be in their favour), I argued, that we may still want to retain the notion o f
character for the many benefits it offers to individuals (both as a collective and as
concerns the individual proper).
Chapter three began with an introduction to Fauconnier and Turner’s mental
space mapping theory, known as conceptual blending. It was suggested that retraining
the problem o f the existence o f global character to one in which its retention
depended upon its usefulness in contexts where prediction was not the only concern
was a novel way in which to challenge the situationist position. First, I described the
component parts and different types o f conceptual blends, before explaining how such
blends are involved in the ways that we think about ourselves and others. Through an
analysis o f how blends are related to our thoughts about character and identity, I was
able to show that the concept o f character is much more than a tool for behavioural
predictions. Indeed, I argued that there are many important ways in which character
type thoughts are deeply useful in promoting things like social cohesion through
empathy, a greater understanding o f self and personal growth by way o f providing a
coherent unity to one’s sense o f identity, and emotional relief in times o f grieving
(among other advantages the character thoughts may provide). Furthermore, it was
shown (in chapter three) that situationist concerns or warnings were, for the most
part, either out o f place or irrelevant to the processes and products o f most o f the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

112

examples o f blends involving character thoughts. Therefore, the limited scope o f
application o f situationist views was partially conveyed.
Finally, I suggested (in chapter four) that Daniel Dennett’s views on the self
were important to how we should understand the notion o f character. It was argued
that the concept o f character may be defined in many different ways and that these
definitions did not all provide the same warrant for situationist conclusions. Indeed,
how one extrapolates from the social psychological data to more general views about
character and virtue was shown to be an area o f concern for both situationists and
advocates o f character and virtue alike. In other words, to make the leap from the
social psychological data to generating inferences about character in general requires
both a careful scrutiny o f the data and a carefully reasoned argument about the
implications o f that data. Moreover, these inferential leaps ought to be given greater
attention by theorists on both sides o f the debate. Ultimately, I agreed with Dennett’s
treatment o f the self and suggested that character be understood in a similar way.
Again, the situationists have argued beyond the reach o f the experimental
data. What they need to obtain greater support for their position is longitudinal
research with favorable findings (however unlikely that may be). However, even if
such research found in favour o f situationism with respect to global traits, we may
still want to retain the notion o f character for the many ways in which it remains
useful to us and beneficial to many cognitive processes and social relationships.
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